Does section 1089 of the California Criminal Code require a jury to disregard all previous deliberations and disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew?

construction of section 1089 requires that deliberations begin anew when a substitution is made after final submission to the jury. This will insure that each of the 12 jurors reaching the verdict has fully participated in the deliberations, just as each had observed and heard all proceedings in the case. We accordingly construe section 1089 to provide that the court instruct the jury to set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew. The jury should be further advised that one of its members has been discharged and replaced with an alternate juror as provided by law; that the law grants to the People and to the defendant the right to a verdict reached only after full participation of the 12 jurors who ultimately return a verdict; that this right may only be assured if the jury begins deliberations again from the beginning; and that each remaining original juror must set aside and disregard the earlier deliberations as if they had not been had. We are confident that juries made aware of the rights involved will faithfully follow such instructions." (Id. at p. 694, fn. omitted.) "[T]he substance of this instruction is mandatory when an alternate is substituted onto the jury after deliberations have begun." (People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.)

This court in People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 1030, determined that although the trial court properly gave CALCRIM No. 3575, it made other comments that implied the jury should not disregard previous deliberations. In that case, after the court clerk swore in the alternate juror, the court stated it received a request from the original jury for a read-back of testimony. "By having the testimony read back, the court answered the original jury's request despite the fact one juror was excused and the alternate juror did not participate in the deliberations that led to the requests. . . . [T]he court's prior statements . . . implied the jury should not disregard previous deliberations but should instead attempt to bring the alternate juror 'up to speed' on the matters already discussed and possibly decided based on the requests the original jury submitted to the trial court." (Id. at p. 1030.) We held the original jury's requests were "'moot' and 'a legal nullity.'" (Ibid.)

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