Does leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident constitute a material element of the charge of manslaughter in the second degree?

We have previously indicated that this language means that one offense must have been a material element of the other (see, People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 264-265, 159 N.Y.S.2d 203, 140 N.E.2d 282). The relevant law and facts of this case demonstrate that the offense of manslaughter in the second degree was a material element of the offense of felony leaving the scene without reporting. Penal Law 125.15 provides that "[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person." Vehicle and Traffic Law 600, which defines leaving the scene of an accident without reporting, makes it a class E felony for "[a]ny person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing or having cause to know that [death or serious physical injury] has been caused to another person, due to the culpability of the person operating such motor vehicle, or due to accident", to fail to stop and provide information and report the incident to the police as soon as possible (Vehicle and Traffic Law 600[2] ). Thus, one of the material elements of the offense of felony leaving the scene that defendant was indicted for was that he had caused death to another person through his culpable conduct which is, in effect, the offense of manslaughter in the second degree when the degree of culpability is recklessness as the jury found here (see, People v. King, 67 Misc.2d 979, 325 N.Y.S.2d 669).