What is the test for a jury to convict a defendant of second-degree murder in a motor vehicle accident?

Chippewa argues that the factual similarities between this case and United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725 (9th Cir.1991), "require[ ] that the result be the same." This is incorrect. While the jury in Loera convicted the defendant of involuntary manslaughter instead of second-degree murder, the verdict, though reasonable, was not compelled by the facts. This court found that evidence of the defendant's prior DUI convictions was properly admitted because the issue of malice aforethought was properly before the jury. Id. at 729 (citing with approval United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1984)). It also held that the jury could infer willfulness because the defendant drove while voluntarily intoxicated. Id. at 728-29. The question of whether to convict of manslaughter or murder remained an issue for the jury, as it was here.

Chippewa next contends that the court erred because it did not include "willfulness" as part of the second-degree murder instructions. "Malice aforethought does not require an element of willfulness if the existence of that malice is inferred from the fact that defendant acted recklessly with extreme disregard for human life." United States v. Houser, 130 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir.1997). The court carefully crafted the instructions in this case to avoid juror confusion.