Does discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house constitute a second degree felony-murder?

Moreover, even if discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, considered in the abstract, were in fact a felony inherently dangerous to human life, the applicability of the second degree felony-murder rule would depend on a negative answer to this further question under the "merger" doctrine: on the evidence adduced at trial, was defendant's discharge of a firearm at the inhabited dwelling house in question an "integral part" of, and "included in fact " within, the resulting homicide? The answer, however, is affirmative. Such was the case in People v. Wesley (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-908, 89 Cal.Rptr. 377, a decision we impliedly approved in People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at page 805, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886. Such is the case here. The record reveals that defendant was engaged in "a single course of conduct with a single purpose," viz.,

Page 623