Does Defendant have any grounds to argue that the trial court erred from a finding that sexual conduct was not admissible?

Defendant also contends the trial court erred procedurally by failing to exercise its discretion in determining the admissibility of the sexual conduct evidence. On the record, after considering the written submissions and oral arguments of the parties, the trial court stated that allowing sexual conduct evidence beyond O.'s prostitution convictions would "abrogate[]" the rape shield laws. Defendant interprets this to mean that the trial court failed to engage in the evidentiary weighing process contemplated by that scheme. We disagree. The People's opposition papers quoted Evidence Code section 352 and explained its relevance in making a section 782 determination, in part arguing that the evidence "is of little probative value and is highly prejudicial." And, as quoted ante, the trial court stated: "I think we have to balance [Evidence Code section] 1103 and impeachment of a witness. [] And if the conduct is admitted, then what we have done is[,] in the name of impeachment[,] just abrogated [section] 1103." Thus, the trial court explicitly referred to the need to "balance." It is clear that the trial court was not stating that such evidence would never be admissible, it was stating it was not admissible for lack of an adequate showing. The fact the trial court did not place on the record the details of its analysis does not mean it did not balance the appropriate factors, as defendant surmises. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6.)