Does a trial court have a duty to instruct a jury on limited admissibility of evidence?

"[W]here, as here, a defendant fails to request an instruction, a trial court 'generally [has] no duty to instruct on the limited admissibility of evidence.' " (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 139; see Evid. Code, 355 ["When evidence is admissible . . . for one purpose and is inadmissible . . . for another purpose, the court upon request

Page 22

shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."], italics added.) There is an exception to this rule as stated in People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 64, in the "occasional extraordinary case in which unprotested evidence . . . is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose." This, however, is a "a narrow exception to the general rule not requiring sua sponte instruction," and it was hypothesized as applying with respect to the admissibility of evidence of other crimes. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 854.) Defendant has not argued that the narrow exception of Collie should apply here, and we conclude the facts do not support its application in this case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to provide an unsought limiting instruction.

4.0 Alleged Brady⁴ Violation