Does a plaintiff have standing to bring an action alleging that he was injured as a result of alleged price-fixing?

On analogous facts, another federal court reached a similar conclusion in Fallis v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc. (6th Cir. 1989) 866 F.2d 209. There, the plaintiff, a sales representative for the defendant, filed an antitrust action alleging that he lost commissions as a result of the defendant's alleged price-fixing scheme. (Id. at pp. 210-211.) The court held that the plaintiff could not maintain his action because his alleged injury was "derivative; it [was] simply a side effect of [the defendant's] alleged antitrust violations. . . . Any injury to [the plaintiff] was merely incidental to the purposes of the alleged price-fixing arrangement," which was "aimed at disciplining retailers and raising consumer prices, not reducing the commissions earned by salespersons." (Ibid.) "As is generally true where the plaintiffs injury is indirect, more direct victims of the alleged conspiracy exist in the present case. . . ." (Id. at p. 211.) "`[I]f the court were to allow all indirect victims standing to sue . . ., the dangers of duplicative recovery and complex apportionment of damages would become very real.' [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 211-212.) "In light of these factors" ? the indirectness of plaintiffs injury, the existence of more direct victims, the possibility of duplicative recovery ? the court held that the plaintiff "lack[ed] antitrust standing." (Id. at p. 212.)