Does a medical examiner have a limited duty to diagnose and treat a patient in the absence of medical treatment?

The majority's embrace of the novel and highly problematic notion that there may be medical malpractice in the absence of medical treatment evidently proceeds from the conviction that the same conduct by a doctor should not be deemed malpractice in one context and negligence in another. Yet, in postulating that a medical examiner, such as defendant, undertakes a limited duty to the examinee not involving "`the full panoply of the physician's typical responsibilities to diagnose and treat'" (majority op. at 635, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 788, 911 N.E.2d at 850, quoting Dyer v. Trachtman, 470 Mich. 45, 50, 679 N.W.2d 311, 314 [2004]), the majority must accept what it

[911 N.E.2d 852]