Can a prison official be found deliberately indifferent to a patient's medical treatment?

Although the defendant's conduct need not have been undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm in order to be found deliberately indifferent, a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" requires that the conduct entailed more than mere negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 847 (a defendant may be found liable if he knows that plaintiff faces "a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it"). Deliberate indifference may be manifested "when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care." Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (the prisoner must show a purposeful act or failure to respond to his pain or medical need and resulting harm caused by the indifference). If the risk of harm was obvious, the trier of fact may infer that a defendant knew of the risk, but obviousness per se will not impart knowledge as a matter of law. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840-42. Even "[i]f a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk." Id.. at 834.