Does a jury's instruction on constructive possession of cocaine fail to adequately cover the material elements of conspiracy and aiding and abetting?

Lizalde's claim fails because the given instructions adequately covered the material elements of conspiracy and aiding and abetting. "A defendant is not entitled to any particular form of an instruction so long as the instructions given fairly and adequately cover the defendant's theories of defense." United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046 (1988). The district judge here instructed the jury that before it could find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, it had to find that the defendant "willfully participated in the unlawful plan, with the intent to advance or further some object or purpose of the conspiracy." Moreover, the judge emphasized later that a defendant could be considered a conspirator if he "knowingly encourages, advises or assists" the unlawful scheme. The instructions thus make it sufficiently clear that active and willful participation was a necessary predicate for a finding of conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir.1977). Lizalde's lawyer in fact acknowledged at trial that the mere presence instruction emerges in one of the general conspiracy instructions. ³ We conclude that the jury instructions were sufficient.

3. Did the district court err in instructing the jury on constructive possession of cocaine?