Does a district court's dismissal of a habeas petition constitute a final order?

Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408, 1410 (9th Cir.1992), does not help the majority. In that case, we held that the granting of part of the petitioner's habeas claim constituted a final, reviewable order, because the district court reached the merits of the claim and intended its disposition to end litigation. Here, by contrast, the district court effectively delayed hearing the merits of Kendall's second and third habeas petitions pending the resolution of the appeal of his first petition. There is no indication that the court intended to dispose of the merits of Kendall's subsequent petitions. I think it is incorrect to characterize the district court's dismissal as leaving "nothing to be done." There is much left to be done, namely deciding the merits of the second and third petitions.