Does a defendant have a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the criminal prosecution?

A criminal defendant "has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the criminal prosecution, i.e., 'all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings' [citation], or 'whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'" (People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 260.) This constitutional right to be present extends to sentencing proceedings (People v. Sanchez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414) and, in certain circumstances, to

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resentencing proceedings (People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 300; People v. Arbee (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 351, 356). In addition, defendants have a statutory right to be present at sentencing. (See 977, subd. (b)(1) ["in all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be personally present at the . . . time of the imposition of sentence"].)³