Does a court have a duty to instruct a sua sponte on the provocation that would reduce first degree murder to second-degree murder?

It is settled that a court must instruct on general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the facts of the case. (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) The duty to instruct sua sponte on general principles encompasses the duty to instruct on defenses that are raised by the evidence, and on lesser included offenses when the evidence has raised a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present. (Id. at pp. 715-716, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.)

The evidence in the present case did not give rise to a duty to instruct sua sponte on the provocation that would reduce first degree murder to second [2 Cal.4th 1130] degree murder. There was no evidence of any provocation, reasonable or unreasonable. People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 169 P.2d 1 does not help defendant because, unlike that case, there was no testimony whatsoever about the existence of a quarrel. The fact that the prosecutor requested a heat of passion instruction for manslaughter does not establish that the evidence would have necessitated a sua sponte instruction. Such instructions are commonly requested out of an abundance of caution.