What is the effect of a city council by-law restricting the use of commercial vehicles without a licence?

Before concluding I think I should say a word about the analogy I see between the case of Clark v. Denton, supra, and this case. There is a difference in form, but I think not in substance, between the two cases. In the English case the objection to the by-law was that the council had exceeded its power by adding, expressly, persons trading in the suburbs, over whom it had no authority, to persons trading in the city and its liberties; here the objection is that, by using broad language expressing no limitation, the council must be assumed to have added public service vehicles earning the major portion of their revenue outside the city, and therefore exempt from licence fees, to those properly chargeable under the statutes. In my opinion, the result must be the same in both cases. Assuming the objections taken to be well founded, the council erred in the one case by saying too much, and in the other by failing to say enough. But in each case there remains something to which the wording of the by-law may properly be applied; in this case it is commercial vehicles, the operation of which without a licence by the appellants as draymen is the subject-matter of the conviction, and which are not comprised in the special provisions of the law affecting only public service vehicles.