If the existing jurisprudence on correctness and reasonableness is unfruitful, what are the factors used to determine correctness and correctness?

If the existing jurisprudence is unfruitful, then the court should review the following factors to choose between correctness and reasonableness (¶ 55): 1. Does a privative clause give statutory direction indicating deference? 2. Is there a discrete and special administrative regime for which the decision maker has special expertise? This involves an analysis of the tribunal’s purpose disclosed by the enabling legislation and the tribunal’s institutional expertise in the field (¶ 64). 3. What is the nature of the question? Issues of fact, discretion or policy, or mixed questions of fact and law where the legal issue cannot readily be separated, generally attract reasonableness (¶ 53). Constitutional issues, legal issues of central importance, and legal issues outside the tribunal’s specialized expertise attract correctness. Correctness also governs “true questions of jurisdiction or vires”, ie. “where the tribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter”. Legal issues that do not rise to these levels may attract a reasonableness standard if this deference is consistent with both (1) any statutory privative provision and (2) any legislative intent that the tribunal exercise its special expertise to interpret its home statute and to govern its administrative regime. Reasonableness may also be warranted if the tribunal has developed an expertise respecting the application of general legal principles within the specific statutory context of the tribunal’s statutory regime. (¶ 55-56, 58-60). See also Young v. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 2009 NSCA 35 at ¶ 29.