Then there is the conventional principle that a cause of action grounded in breach of contract arises when the breach occurs. Thus in Fritz v. Knorr, supra, such a cause of action was found to have arisen, within the meaning of s. 3 (1)(f)(i) of the Limitation of Actions Act on breach of the contract, not when the damage flowing from the breach became evident. This finding is consistent with the principle that damage is not a component of a cause of action founded on breach of contract (as it is of a cause of action grounded in the tort of negligence). The finding is also consistent with the terms in which this Court defined the phrase “cause of action” in F.P. v. Saskatchewan 2004 SKCA 59 (CanLII), [2005] 3 W.W.R. 257; 249 Sask. R. 42; 325 W.A.C. 42; 2004 SKCA 59: “[28] Statutes that preclude the commencement of actions by reason of the passage of time often do so by barring an action unless brought within a specified time after the cause of action ‘arose’. By ‘cause of action’ is generally meant the fact or set of facts which give a person a right to bring an action, a right that ‘arises’, in the conventional sense, on the occurrence of that fact or set of facts.” ...
"The most advanced legal research software ever built."
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.