Can an order requiring or dispensing with an alleged father's consent for the adoption of a child be appealed from in the same manner as an order of the juvenile court declaring a person to be a ward?

Section 7669 states, in pertinent part: An order requiring or dispensing with an alleged father's consent for the adoption of a child may be appealed from in the same manner as an order of the juvenile court declaring a person to be a ward of the juvenile court and is conclusive and binding upon the alleged father. ( 7669, subd. (a).) The statutory language itself is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) The language of section 7669 clearly authorizes a right to appeal and provides a separate procedure for appeal from that used in unlimited civil cases by adopting the procedure applicable to juvenile court orders declaring a person to be a ward.

When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it . (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 800, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) However here, where Marcos J. argues that section 7669 provides for not merely a right to appeal but a choice of methods of bringing the appeal, a resort to the legislative history of the code section is instructive.