Can a motion for attorney's fees be used to harass plaintiffs, harass and increase costs of litigation?

Garcia v. Hyster Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 724, 736-737.) Therefore, they conclude, the "sole purpose in bringing the motion for attorney's fees was to harass Plaintiffs, to cause unnecessary delay and to increase costs of litigation."

We cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion. Even if defendants' motion was flawed because it failed to adequately correlate the fees claimed with the effort to prove the matters denied, this does not necessarily mean the motion was brought for an improper purpose. Nor does it appear to us to have been frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal foundation. Defendants propounded requests for admission, which plaintiffs denied, thereby putting defendants to the task of proving the truth of the matters denied. The cost of proof sanction under section 2033.420 is designed for just such a situation. (See Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 509 [statute is "designed to reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a party in proving the truth of a requested admission"].) Thus, even if the motion was inadequately supported, it had a sound legal basis. Based on our record, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that defendants' motion was not presented primarily for an improper purpose.