Can a court subvert the legislative process and impose cruel or unusual punishment on a convicted rapist?

Citing People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 477-489, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697, appellant contends imposition of the penalty provided by law would constitute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.

The power to define crimes and prescribe punishments is a legislative function. The court may not subvert the legislative process unless the statute prescribes a penalty which is so severe in relation to the crime as to violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. The basic test is whether the punishment is so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. (People v. Dillon, supra at p. 478, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697.)