Can a "bystander" recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress?

The right of a "bystander" to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress was first recognized in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912. Dillon held that as in other negligence cases, liability exists only where defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 740, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912.) "Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case. Because it is inherently intertwined with foreseeability such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis." (Id. at p. 740, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912.) The court declined to define that obligation, choosing instead to provide guidelines to aid courts in determining reasonable foreseeability of the harm in each case. (Ibid.) Courts were instructed to "take into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship." (Id. at pp. 740-741, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912.)