Can an employee recover damages for a mental health injury sustained by his former employer as a result of intentional infliction of emotional distress?

Appellant first contends that respondents' motion was actually a motion for summary judgment and that they evaded the notice requirements of the summary judgment statute by characterizing their motion as made under Code of Civil Procedure section 597. Even if this motion was a motion for summary judgment, appellant waived any objections to respondents' failure to give notice as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c when he appeared at the hearing and argued the motion on the merits without any reference to the failure to provide adequate notice. (See, e.g., Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 27, 210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134.)

The issue is whether the court erred in

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Labor Code sections 3600 and 3602 bar liability only for physical or emotional injury, not other types of injuries that may be involved. We interpret Howland v. Balma (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 899, 192 Cal.Rptr. 286, to sanction the severance of damage claims for personal injuries covered by workers' compensation from the remaining elements of damages if the cause of action is otherwise directed to some other injury unrelated to the compensable personal injury. In Howland the court held that the fact that the employee had suffered a compensable injury should not preclude him from suing for the damage to his reputation, which the court deemed not to be an action for personal injury compensable by workers' compensation. ¹⁰ Instead, [212 Cal.App.3d 500] the court held the employee was only precluded from recovering "damages for 'psychiatric and medical consultation' and legal costs in processing his disability application. . .." (Id. at p. 906, fn. 8, 192 Cal.Rptr. 286.)

We hold that if an employee suffers an injury compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, he or she may not recover any damages icaused by that injury in a civil action for damages unless some exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act is available. If, as is the case with a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the only injury involved is the compensable injury to the psyche, then the entire cause of action should be dismissed. However, where an employee sues for breach of contract, and the same conduct also caused a compensable injury, that employee should simply be precluded from recovering any damages caused by the compensable injury in a suit against his former employer. In other words, rather than rely on the title of a cause of action, we shall examine the underlying injury to determine whether the "essence" of the cause of action is personal injury or death. (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d 148, 160, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308, 729 P.2d 743.)