What is the test for assessing damages for loss of opportunity?

74 The appellants then contend that even if the trial judge selected the correct measure of damages, he ought to have applied a higher discount for contingencies, particularly the contingencies that (1) Sylvan (Bell) lacked the financial resources to exercise the option and fund the project, and (2) the project could not in any event have been completed by the end of 1994, as required. In essence, they argue that in assessing damages, the court must discount the value of the chance of profit by the improbability of its occurrence, and call in aid the observation of Crocket J. in Kinkel v. Hyman, 1939 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1939] S.C.R. 364, at p. 383: For my part, I can find no authority . . . justifying any court in awarding any more than a nominal sum as damages for the loss of a mere chance of possible benefit except upon evidence proving that there was some reasonable probability of the plaintiff realizing therefrom an advantage of some real substantial monetary value.