Upon divorce, how do New York courts determine which spouse gets to keep pets acquired during the marriage?

While the dog owners of New York might uniformly regard their pets as being far more than mere property, the law of the State of New York is in many ways still largely at odds with that view. The prevailing law, which has been slow to evolve, is that, irrespective of how strongly people may feel, a dog is in fact personal property—sometimes referred to as “chattel”—just like a car or a table (see Mullaly v. People, 86 N.Y. 365 [1881]; Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 13 A.D.3d 150, 788 N.Y.S.2d 4 [1st Dept. 2004]; Rowan v. Sussdorff, 147 App.Div. 673, 132 N.Y.S. 550 [2d Dept. 1911]; ATM One, LLC v. Albano, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 50103[U], 2001 WL 1722773 [Nassau Dist. Ct. 2001] ). This means that if a veterinarian negligently dispatches your treasured Yorkshire terrier, the most you can count on recovering as compensation is the animal's fair market value (see

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Jason v. Parks, 224 A.D.2d 494, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170 [2d Dept. 1996]). And unless your Yorkshire terrier was a pure-bred show dog, that fair market value, as opposed to sentimental, will be relatively small no matter how wonderful the dog was or how heartbroken and traumatized your family is by its loss (see Smith v. Palace Transp., 142 Misc. 93, 253 N.Y.S. 87 [N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1931] [a fox terrier]; Mercurio v. Weber, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51036[U], 2003 WL 21497325 [Nassau Dist. Ct. 2003] [Dexter and Bentley, Yorkshire terriers]). Similarly, if that same veterinarian successfully treats the dog but for some reason refuses to return it, your remedy is to bring an action for replevin—the same remedy you would have if an automobile mechanic refused to return your Volvo or your Ford (see Merriam v. Johnson, 116 App.Div. 336, 101 N.Y.S. 627 [1st Dept. 1906]).

Replevin is the means by which non-matrimonial actions regarding ownership and possession of dogs have generally come before New York courts (see e.g. Le Conte v. Lee, 35 Misc.3d 286, 935 N.Y.S.2d 842 [Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 2011] [Bubkus, a maltese]; Webb v. Papaspiridakos, 23 Misc.3d 1136 [A], 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51152[U], 2009 WL 1605949 [Sup. Ct., Queens County 2009] [Precious, a Jack Russell terrier]; Saunders v. Reeger, 50 Misc.2d 850, 271 N.Y.S.2d 788 [Suffolk Dist. Ct. 1966] [Misty, an Irish setter]; see also Cent. W. Humane Socy., Inc. v. Hilleboe, 202 Misc. 881, 884, 116 N.Y.S.2d 403 [Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1952] [discussing the value of dogs in general and an owner's property rights in them]; Mongelli v. Cabral, 166 Misc.2d 240, 632 N.Y.S.2d 927 [Yonkers City Ct. 1995] [small claims action over Peaches, a Molluccan Cockatoo]). With the standard for replevin being “superior possessory right in the chattel” (Pivar v. Graduate Sch. of Figurative Art of the N.Y. Academy of Art, 290 A.D.2d 212, 735 N.Y.S.2d 522 [1st Dept. 2002]), it is the property rights of the litigants, rather than their respective abilities to care for the dog or their emotional ties to it, that are ultimately determinative.

Even in the one reported case where a New York court awarded temporary possession of a pet in the context of a divorce proceeding, C.R.S. v. T.K.S., 192 Misc.2d 547, 746 N.Y.S.2d 568 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2002], the award to the wife of the couple's “five year-old chocolate labrador retriever” was based solely on the fact that the dog was an “interspousal gift” to her. Any doubt that the court in C.R.S. was utilizing a strict property analysis in its granting of temporary possession is confirmed by the direction in the decision that “[t]he determination of the final distributive award of the dog will be made at trial. A credit for any proven value of the dog could be made at that time” (id. at 550, 746 N.Y.S.2d 568). The clear implication is that the Labrador retriever was to be “distributed” just like any other item of marital property subject to equitable distribution, be it a television or a set of dishes.³

Nevertheless, at the same time that the traditional property view has continued to hold sway, there has been a slow but steady move in New York case law away from looking at dogs and other household pets in what may be seen as an overly reductionist and utilitarian manner. One of the first of these cases, Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital, Inc., 97 Misc.2d 530, 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 [Civ. Ct., Queens County 1979], involved a veterinarian who

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wrongfully disposed of the remains of the plaintiff's poodle and then attempted to conceal the fact by putting the body of a dead cat in the dog's casket. Finding that the distressed and anguished plaintiff was entitled to recover damages beyond the market value of the dog, the court held that “a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a personal piece of property” (id. at 531, 415 N.Y.S.2d 182).

In this same vein, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in a 2008 case brought by a cat owner against an animal shelter, cited the extensive array of laws that exist in New York for the protection of pets (Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter, 59 A.D.3d 68, 870 N.Y.S.2d 124 [2d Dept. 2008] ). The court, after observing that “[t]he reach of our laws has been extended to animals in areas which were once reserved only for people,” went on to underscore that “[t]hese laws indicate that companion animals are treated differently from other forms of property. Recognizing companion animals as a special category of property is consistent with the laws of the State ...” (id. at 72, 870 N.Y.S.2d 124).

It is from this state though, and from the First Department in particular, that we have one of the most important statements from a “modern court” as to the “de-chattelization” of household pets. The case Raymond v. Lachmann, 264 A.D.2d 340, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308 [1st Dept. 1999] is certainly the most relevant to the inquiry as to how a court should best proceed when dealing with a dispute like the one over Joey. In Raymond, the court was called upon to resolve the issue of who was entitled to “ownership and possession of the subject cat, Lovey, nee Merlin.” ⁴ In a short, poignant opinion, the court wrote:

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Cognizant of the cherished status accorded to pets in our society, the strong emotions engendered by disputes of this nature, and the limited ability of the courts to resolve them satisfactorily, on the record presented, we think it best for all concerned that, given his limited life expectancy, Lovey, who is now almost ten years old, remain where he has lived, prospered, loved and been loved for the past four years (id. at 341, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308).

Raymond is significant for both what it does and does not do. The decision is a clear statement that the concept of a household pet like Lovey being mere property is outmoded. Consequently, it employs a new perspective for determining possession and ownership of a pet, one that differs radically from the traditional property analysis. This new view takes into consideration, and gives paramount importance to, the intangible, highly subjective factors that are called into play when a cherished pet is the property at issue. The factors touched upon in the decision include the concern for Lovey's well-being as an elderly cat and the special relationship that existed between him and the person with whom he was living, a relationship that is described, rather nicely, as one where Lovey has “loved and been loved.” In making its determination to keep Lovey in his present home, the First Department apparently concluded that the intangibles transcended the ordinary indicia of actual ownership or right to possession such as title, purchase, gift, and the like.

After reviewing the progression of the law in both New York and other states, it can be concluded that in a case such as this, where two spouses are battling over a dog they once possessed and raised together, a strict property analysis is neither desirable nor appropriate. Although Joey the miniature dachshund is not a human being and cannot be treated as such, he is decidedly more than a piece of property, marital or otherwise. As a result, whether plaintiff bought Joey from the pet store with her own funds or whether defendant received him from plaintiff as a gift is only one factor to consider when determining what becomes of him.

But if not a strict property analysis, what should be the process by which Joey's fate is decided and what standard should be applied in making that determination? Should the court adopt a custody analysis similar to that used for child custody? And if so, is the well-established standard of “best interests of the child” to be replaced by that of “best interests of the canine?”

Because of the paucity of New York case law addressing these matters, it is useful to turn once again to decisions from the courts of other states. There are a small number of cases that actually use the term “custody” in making an award of a dog to a spouse or ex-spouse (see e.g. Juelfs, 41 P.3d 593 [granting “sole custody” of Coho the chocolate Labrador retriever to ex-husband]; Van Arsdale v. Van Arsdale, 2013 WL 1365358, *4 [2013], 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 574 [“The parties shall have joint legal custody of the labrador retrievers but the labrador retrievers' principal place of residence shall be with plaintiff”]).

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One decision, Placey v. Placey, 51 So.3d 374 [Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2010], in which the court relied on an Alabama animal protection statute in awarding “a dog named Preston” to one family member over another, goes so far as to expressly refer to the “best interests” of the dog.

The majority of cases from other jurisdictions, however, have declined to extend child custody precepts to dog disputes. Some have been plainly dismissive (see e.g. Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 [Pa. Super. Ct. 2002] [shared custody of a dog, Barney, not permissible because he is personal property and as such, said arrangement would be “analogous, in law, to [custody of] a table or a lamp”]). Particularly notable is the language used in Clark v. McGinnis, 298 P.3d 1137 [Kan. Ct. App. 2013] [table; text at 2013 WL 1444421, 2013 Kan App Unpub. LEXIS 305 [Kan. Ct. App. 2013]]. There, the Kansas Court of Appeals declined to award the appellant “custody” of Dinky, one of the parties' three dogs. In holding that the “argument that child custody laws should be applied to dogs is a flawed argument,” the court observed, with the classic Midwestern gift for stating the obvious, that “[o]ne relevant difference between children and dogs is that children are human beings and dogs are domestic animals” (id. at 2013 WL 1444421, *2, 2013 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 305, *7).

Still, there is a good body of case law from other states that, while not embracing the application of child custody principles to cases of dog ownership and possession, takes a nuanced position that considers at least some of the factors traditionally associated with child custody (see e.g. Baggett v. Baggett, 2013 WL 4606383, *12 [Tenn. Ct. App. 2013] [“As to ownership of the parties' dogs, it is evident that the trial court considered their needs and the ability of the parties to care for them”]; Aho v. Aho, 2012 WL 5235982, *5 [Mich. Ct. App. 2012] [“[T]he trial court found that awarding Finn [the dog] to plaintiff was proper in order to keep all of the animals together”]; see also Wolf v. Taylor, 224 Or.App. 245, 250, 197 P.3d 585 [Ore. Ct. App. 2008] [while not directly addressing issue of whether agreement regarding visitation of a dog is enforceable, positing that it “certainly is an interesting question”]).

With the exception of Placey, the Alabama case, even the decisions employing custody or custody-like considerations to dog disputes have uniformly rejected the application of a “best interests” standard. As the Vermont Supreme Court stated in Morgan, a case pitting the former owner of a lost dog against its finder: “[T]he trial court was correct that family law provides an imperfect analogue. However strong the emotional attachments between pets and humans, courts simply cannot evaluate the best interests' of an animal” (167 Vt. at 103, 702 A.2d 630). Similarly, in Houseman v. Dare, 405 N.J.Super. 538, 544, 966 A.2d 24, 28 [2009], a case in which former fiances ended their engagement but proceeded to remain tied to one another through extensive litigation over their dog, the court acknowledged that “sincere affection for and attachment to” a pet is a special subjective value that needs to be considered “in resolving questions about possession.” But the New Jersey court, quoting Morgan with respect to a court's inability to evaluate an animal's best interests, stated: “We are less confident that there are judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving questions of possession from the perspective of a pet, at least apart from cases involving abuse or neglect contrary to public policies expressed in laws designed to protect animals” (id. at 545, 966 A.2d 24).

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Although the opinion by the First Department in Raymond can be read as a firm declaration that household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel, the decision, irrespective of its use of language that is in some ways suggestive of a child custody, does not direct that the resolution of a pet dispute be undertaken by engaging in a process comparable to a child custody proceeding. Nor does it state that a court should utilize a best interests standard in determining to whom the pet should be awarded. In fact, the term “best interests” appears nowhere in the decision. Instead, the term that is used is “best for all concerned” (id. at 341, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308). Thus, when the parties here cite Raymond for the proposition that Joey's “best interests” must be considered in determining their competing claims for him, the citation is inapposite (see Dubin v. Pelletier, 2012 WL 5983184 [R.I. Super. Ct. 2012] [in determining possession of a Norfolk terrier “fondly referred to as Mr. Big,” citing Raymond for its standard of “best for all concerned,” but noting that the Raymond court was “not engaging in best interests analysis”]).⁵

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With this in mind, it is appropriate that the parties here be given a full hearing. Full does not mean extended; the hearing shall not exceed one day. The standard to be applied will be what is “best for all concerned,” the standard utilized in Raymond. In accordance with that standard, each side will have the opportunity to prove not only why she will benefit from having Joey in her life but why Joey has a better chance of living, prospering, loving and being loved in the care of one spouse as opposed to the other. To this end, the parties may need to address questions like: Who bore the major responsibility for meeting Joey's needs (i.e., feeding, walking, grooming and taking him to the veterinarian) when the parties lived together? Who spent more time with Joey on a regular basis? Why did plaintiff leave Joey with defendant, as defendant alleges, at the time the couple separated? And perhaps most importantly, why has defendant chosen to have Joey live with her mother in Maine, rather than with her, or with plaintiff for that matter, in New York?

The law pertaining to animals has evolved significantly. Initially disputes regarding animals were decided using a traditional property law analysis. However, that approach has begun to give way to acknowledge the role of animals in our lives, and to recognize that animals are undoubtedly more significant than a chair, table or other piece of property. The court relies on Justice Cooper's thoughtful and detailed analysis in Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc 3d 447 (Sup Ct. NY Cty. 2013) as guidance in its determination as to which party should be ultimately awarded possession of Charlie, the dog.

In Travis v. Murray, the Plaintiff in a divorce proceeding moved for an order seeking return of the couple's dog, Joey, as well as an award of "sole residential custody" of Joey. The Plaintiff argued that she had purchased Joey from the pet store when he was a 10-week old puppy. Eight months later, the Defendant moved out of the apartment and took Joey with her, and later gave Joey to her mother, who resided in Maine. Similar to the Mother's argument in this matter, the Plaintiff argued a traditional property approach under the theory of replevin, namely that she had a greater property right to Joey given that she bought him. The Defendant in Travis v. Murray made arguments similar to the Father in this matter, focusing more on her care of the dog and argued that it was in Joey's "best interests" that she be allowed to keep him. In reviewing the dearth of legal authority on this issue, the court ultimately determined that the appropriate standard was "best for all concerned," as articulated in the First Department's decision of Raymond v. Lachman, 264 AD2d 340, 341 (1st Dep't 2013) that addressed a dispute over "custody" of Lovey, the cat. Ultimately, the court in Travis v. Murray ordered a "full" hearing to determine what was "best for all concerned" as it related to Joey. The court cautioned against an extended hearing, limiting the hearing to one day, noting the scarcity of judicial resources. Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc 3d at 459-461. To further prevent additional litigation, the court ruled that, absent a successful appeal, whichever spouse is awarded Joey shall have sole possession of the dog, at the total exclusion of the other. Id.

Accordingly, this court declines to follow a traditional property analysis in determining which party shall ultimately keep Charlie, and instead employs the "best for all concerned" standard as articulated in Raymond v. Lachman, 264 AD2d 340, 341 (1st Dep't 2013) and followed in Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc 3d 447, 459-461 (Sup Ct. NY Cty 2013). As a result, the Mother's argument that she "bought" Charlie is but one factor that this court will consider. Another, more relevant factor is that when the Mother had possession of Charlie, she gave him to her sister, causing the Father to file a motion to have Charlie returned to him in December 2017.

While neither party gave significant testimony about Charlie, it is undisputed that Charlie has been in the Father's care since December 2017. During the brief period of time (September-December 2017) that Charlie was solely in the Mother's possession, the Mother testified that the Father on occasion asked to take Charlie for the weekend, to which she agreed. (Tr. 143) The Father testified that he has been Charlies' primary caregiver, and that given he is an active person, takes Charlie for runs all the time. The Mother's claim to Charlie rests primarily on the fact that she purchased the dog. However, the court finds that the credible testimony at trial of this matter, and prior proceedings, make clear that Charlie's adoption was a mutual decision, initiated by the Father, and that the Father has provided the bulk of Charlie's care since adoption.

The court finds significant that during the outset of these proceedings, the Mother had given the dog to her sister, rather than give Charlie to the Father, who clearly would have wanted the dog. Since this court awarded the Father temporary possession of Charlie in December 2017, the Mother never sought or requested to see Charlie, and provided no testimony as to how she would care for the dog should he be returned to her. The Mother barely addressed Charlie in her summation other than to request return of the dog. Indeed, when the Father sought Charlie's return in 2017, the Mother indicated that she would agree to split access so long as the Father would pay for Charlie's care. There is no evidence that Charlie is being mistreated by the Father in any way. Given the Child's age, he has not yet formed a bond with the dog, as the Mother herself seemed to acknowledge. Further, the Mother's detailed testimony as to her daily schedule and care of the Child would presumably leave little time to care for Charlie. For all these reasons, the court finds that the "best for all concerned" standard must result in an award of sole possession of Charlie, the dog, to the Father. Raymond v. Lachman, 264 AD2d 340, 341 (1st Dep't 2013) and followed in Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc 3d 447, 459-461 (Sup Ct. NY Cty 2013).

Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the applicable standard is “the best for all concerned,” as set forth in Travis v. Murray (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 460 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County 2013]). Notwithstanding the Stipulation of the parties, the court determines that this is the correct standard to be applied in dog possession cases.

Although important, ownership is just one factor to consider when determining who should possess the dog based on the best for all concerned analysis. The court must also consider intangible factors such as why each party would benefit from having the dog in his or her life and why the dog has a better chance of prospering, loving and being loved in the care of one party or the other (Raymond, 264 A.D.2d at 341; Travis, 42 Misc.3d at 460). Additionally, the court considers who is in the best position to meet the dog's daily physical and emotional needs based on a healthy, active lifestyle, time constraints, type of home and yard, emotional bond, safety concerns, financial ability, opportunities to socialize with other dogs, access to dog-friendly parks and outdoor activities and access to veterinary care and pet stores. The court will also consider each party's ability to care for the dog, including, but not necessarily limited to, feeding, watering, walking, grooming, bathing petting, playing, training, taking the dog to the veterinarian and engaging in other recreational and dog-friendly activities.

Based on the totality of the evidence, the court finds that it is best for all concerned for Defendant to retain sole possession of Django. Django has lived at the same location with Defendant without incident for 4½ years, except during the year when the parties alternated caring for him. Django has thrived and prospered without Plaintiff in his life for almost two years. To suddenly uproot Django and send him across the country to live with Plaintiff would disrupt the dog's daily routine, healthy and energetic lifestyle and loving and happy home. The current environment appears to enhance the chances of both Django and Defendant living a long and prosperous life together.

It is unreasonable for Plaintiff to expect to prevail under these circumstances when it was primarily his choices which led to Defendant retaining sole possession of Django. It was Plaintiff who decided to break up with Defendant and move out of their apartment. It was Plaintiff who decided to move across country and make it virtually impossible to continue their agreed upon alternating care arrangement. Additionally, it was Plaintiff who withheld the details of his move. Defendant and Django appear to have moved on with their lives and they both seem to be prospering with each other's affection and companionship.

Traditionally, New York courts have treated companion animals as personal property; as with other personal property, courts resolved disputes by evaluating which party had the superior possessory right to the animal (Travis v Murray, 42 Misc 3d 447 [Sup Ct, New York County 2013]). Accordingly, the appropriate action to recover possession of a companion animal in non-matrimonial contexts lies in replevin (see, e.g. LeConte v Lee, 35 Misc 3d 286 [Civ Ct, New York County 2011]).

More recently, however, courts have recognized the myriad ways in which companion animals are much more than simple possessions. In Raymond v Lachmann, the First Department acknowledged "the cherished status accorded to pets in our society, the strong emotions engendered by disputes of this nature, and the limited ability of the courts to resolve them satisfactorily" (264 AD2d 340, 341 [1st Dept 1999]). In doing so, the court established that simple adherence to traditional principles of property ownership is outmoded and inappropriate where a treasured pet is involved, and that a court must also consider those intangible and subjective factors invariably involved.

An applicable standard was further developed by the court in Travis v Murray (42 Misc 3d 447 [Sup Ct, New York County 2013]), a matrimonial dispute. In an eloquent and detailed discussion, the Travis court examined the wide variety of approaches taken by the courts in several jurisdictions, including that in Raymond. The Travis court ultimately concluded that a refinement of the "best for all concerned" standard applied by the Raymond court struck the best balance between a strict property analysis and the more extensive interests analysis involved in child custody cases. This standard has been subsequently applied by several courts (see, e.g. Mitchell v Snider, 51 Misc 3d 1229[A] [Civil Ct, New York County 2016]; Ramseur v Atkins, 44 Misc 3d 1209[A] [Civ Ct, New York County 2014]; Hennet v Allan, 43 Misc 3d 542 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2014])).

Following the "best for all concerned" approach, this Court will therefore examine not just those factors that would weigh towards the parties’ respective possessory rights, but also "intangible factors such as why each party would benefit from having the dog in his or her life and why the dog has a better chance of prospering, loving, and being loved in the care of one party or the (Mitchell v Snider, 51 Misc 3d 1229[A] at *2 [Civ Ct, New York County 2016]). Relevant facts include those that reflect each party's ability to meet the dog's physical and emotional needs, including financial circumstances, access to outdoor activities, opportunities for exercise and socialization, access to veterinary care and necessary supplies, and the time required to meet the dog's need's on a daily basis.

Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the Court finds first that the traditional markers of ownership are non-dispositive. Maximus was obtained without payment, and the costs and tasks associated with ownership (such as vaccinations, licensing, insurance) were split between the parties. It is important to note that the issue of ownership may have been clearer had Maximus been properly adopted according to AMC protocol. Notwithstanding, it is evident that both parties intended to and did benefit from circumventing the established rules to obtain Maximus more quickly and without cost.

While defendant repeatedly maintained that he was only ever understood to be the sole owner and Maximus simply "shared" with plaintiff, the parties’ subsequent conduct (dividing of expenses and documentation, sharing in Maximus’ daily care, holding out to other members of the community that Maximus was "their" dog) further points to shared ownership. Whether certain documents had the name of one or the other party is less relevant where clearly each party contributed both effort and money, and where both parties were recognized by others as co-owners.

The Court acknowledges that each party has, in turn, resorted to a bad faith tactic in an effort to retain possession of Maximus: first plaintiff, in failing to return Maximus in accordance with their informal shared custody agreement, then defendant in surreptitiously removing Maximus from his veterinary appointment. While the above behavior is not excusable, the Court also recognizes that each party cares deeply for the Maximus and derives much from Maximum's companionship. And unlike in other cases examined by this Court, there is no clear discrepancy in the parties’ intentions; for example, neither party seeks to exploit Maximus for income-generating practices such as breeding. And it is clear that the party who emerges unsuccessful from this litigation will feel the loss of a dear companion. Nonetheless, the Court must make the—albeit difficult—determination of which party would benefit most from retaining possession of Maximus and which party is in the position to best provide for Maximus’ physical and emotional needs.

Each party has demonstrated the knowledge and financial capacity to provide for Maximums’ needs, and each is prepared to commit his time and energy to do so. However, based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the Court finds that plaintiff has met his burden to show that possession of Maximus should be awarded to him. Plaintiff has testified that his work schedule provides him a substantial amount of time to spend with Maximus and the ability to bring him to work on a frequent basis. Indeed, plaintiff's colleague testified that Maximus appeared comfortable at the office and was afforded freedom to roam when he wanted. Plaintiff's longtime friend, Elizabeth Wheaton, testified that plaintiff structured his non-work hours around Maximus’ needs, ensuring that Maximus’ needs were met before all else. She further testified that Maximus so frequently accompanied their group of friends that their own friends and family were well acquainted with the dog. Finally, the testimony established that when plaintiff and defendant were not able to bring Maximus someplace, Maximus’ care fell to plaintiff's friends or family, guided by a lengthy and detailed document drafted by plaintiff himself.

Defendant testified that his work hours allow more limited time to spend with Maximus, and that he brought Maximus to work less frequently. There was no testimony as to who would care for Maximus in the event that defendant had to travel or otherwise was unable to care for him. During the period of time that plaintiff held Maximus past his agreed-upon time period, defendant did not make efforts to recover him until collecting him from the veterinary appointment several months later. To the extent that defendant, a veterinarian, currently provides the specialized care that Maximus requires, he conceded that such care could readily be provided by another veterinarian and facility.

In sum, plaintiff has shown that he has intimate knowledge of Maximus’ physical and emotional needs and that he has the ability to spend significant time caring for and socializing Maximus. Plaintiff has further shown that he can care for Maximus while at work and on vacation, and that Maximus has become such an ingrained part of plaintiff's life that his friends and family have themselves taken on parts of Maximus’ care.