If a plaintiff is financially unable to pay anticipated arbitration costs can they pursue the action in court despite being subject to an arbitration agreement?

In its explicit approval of Roldan and the relief afforded the plaintiff there, the Supreme Court in Jameson recognized a trial court's jurisdiction on remand to determine if a plaintiff is unable to pay arbitration costs and, if so, to offer the defendant law firm two alternatives:" 'elect to either pay that plaintiff's share of the arbitration cost and remain in arbitration or waive its right to arbitrate that plaintiff's claim.' (Roldan, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 96.)" (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 621-622.)

17

In choosing to follow Roldan's approach, we are not unmindful of the authority on which MKJA relies, which the trial court adopted and which Emergent urges us to endorse. But we find more persuasive the Supreme Court's approval of the cases in which it and our sister courts have not allowed the absence of legislation or, occasionally, contrary statutes to bar indigent litigants from pursuing their constitutional rights. (Pp. 11-16, ante; Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 605-606.) "Moreover, this line of cases also demonstrates that the exercise of judicial discretion in furtherance of facilitating equal access to justice is not limited to excusing the payment of fees that the government charges for government-provided services. Judicial authority to facilitate meaningful access to indigent litigants extends as well to excusing statutorily imposed expenses that are intended to protect third parties (e.g., injunction or damage bonds) and to devising alternative procedures (e.g., additional methods of service or meaningful access) so that indigent litigants are not, as a practical matter, denied their day in court." (Jameson, at p. 605.)

Unlike Conover and similar cases where relieving an indigent of the statutory obligation to post a bond could jeopardize the prevailing party's recovery, the Roldan remedy affords Emergent two alternatives, both of which protect the right to a fair, neutral tribunal to decide the case. Emergent can advance Aronow's share of the arbitrator's fee or, as it would absent the arbitration provision in the retainer agreement, try the case to a jury or court. We have no doubt that we strike the balance-between enforcing the language of the arbitration provision and Aronow's changed financial circumstances-consistent with the indigent litigant jurisprudence Jameson recounts.

The trial court expressed concern that adopting the Roldan analysis "threatens to open the courts to extensive, burdensome, and potentially unmanageable litigation." In its view, Roldan "mandates an ill-defined inquiry in each case into the financial ability of the contracting party to proceed with arbitration." The trial court invited us "to provide all trial courts with valuable guidance." As we explain, trial courts are well equipped to analyze a litigant's ability to pay arbitration fees.

We begin with guidance from our Supreme Court. In response to the argument that fee allocation should be decided at the conclusion of an arbitration, the Court in Armendariz recognized that "it is not only the costs imposed on the claimant but the risk that the claimant may have to bear substantial costs that deters the exercise of the constitutional right of due process." (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 110, italics in original.) "Because we conclude the imposition of substantial forum fees is contrary to public policy, and is therefore grounds for invalidating or revoking an arbitration agreement and denying a petition to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281 and 1281.2, we hold that the cost issues should be resolved not at the judicial review stage but when a court is petitioned to compel arbitration." (Ibid.)

We, too, conclude that the trial court should decide the issue of arbitrator fee payment and it should be resolved before commencement of the

21

arbitration. We do not prescribe a singular procedure, but-in response to the trial court's request-suggest various alternatives, recognizing that the circumstances of a case will inform the trial court's decision how to proceed. That approach does not unduly burden the trial court and allows it to balance the parties' due process rights with the need for judicial economy.

As we observed, in forma pauperis status is not a prerequisite; however, the procedures for that determination provide a ready template should the trial court decide to employ it. (Gov. Code, § 68630 et seq.) In enacting the remedy for indigent litigants, the Legislature found "[t]hat our legal system cannot provide 'equal justice under law' unless all persons have access to the courts without regard to their economic means. California law and court procedures should ensure that court fees are not a barrier to court access for those with insufficient economic means to pay those fees." (Gov. Code, § 68630, subd. (a).) In response to a petition to compel arbitration, a litigant who claims financial inability to pay the arbitrator's fee could submit the Judicial Council application form and the financial statement prescribed by Government Code section 68633, subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2). "The court may delegate to the clerk the authority to grant applications for an initial fee waiver that meet the standards of eligibility and application requirements set forth in Sections 68632 and 68633." (Gov. Code, § 68634, subd. (d).) Where a party seeking relief from paying the arbitrator's fee is one of the persons enumerated in Government Code section 68632's list of persons "eligible to proceed without paying court fees and costs," the decision would be ministerial. Where the clerk is unable to grant the request, at the section 1281.2 hearing the judge can follow the fee waiver procedure and make the determination just as judges do where the clerk does not grant a fee waiver request. (Gov. Code, § 68634.5, subd. (e).) This approach minimizes the

22

judge's role, avoids the trial court's concern about "extensive, burdensome, and potentially unmanageable litigation," and responds to its request for guidance. It will allow the trial court to decide a litigant's ability to pay arbitration costs and achieve the Legislature's stated goal of assuring" 'equal justice under law'" (Gov. Code, § 68630, subd. (a)) for indigent litigants subject to an arbitration provision.

At oral argument, Emergent claimed the right to challenge in forma pauperis status and asserted the need to conduct discovery to pursue that objection. We recognize that interest and conclude, where appropriate, it can be accommodated by the trial court. Where a party to a contract with an arbitration provision opposes a motion to compel arbitration on the ground of inability to pay the costs, the moving party can ask leave to conduct limited discovery directed only to the opponent's financial circumstances. We do not share Emergent's concern that such limited discovery would waive its right to arbitrate. While taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration is one of several factors for assessing whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate (see St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1196), the discovery at issue in the cases finding waiver bears no resemblance to the discovery Emergent desires here. (E.g., Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 342, 356 [defendant produced "multiple deponents" who were questioned on class issues, and also deposed plaintiff and 25 putative class members]; Bower v. Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1045 [defendant propounded classwide discovery that "was not de minimis, and was not propounded to preserve some right to seek discovery that would otherwise be lost"]; Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 18 [defendants propounded "a set of form interrogatories, a set of 236 special interrogatories, and a document

23

demand that resulted in the production of over 60, 000 documents," and also deposed person with most knowledge about the complaint's allegations].) Emergent's efforts to obtain limited discovery about Aronow's finances will not implicate any of the other factors relating to waiver, such as acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate or substantially invoking"' the litigation machinery.'" (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California, at p. 1196.) Because "waivers are not to be lightly inferred and the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof" (id. at p. 1195), Emergent's fears about waiving its right to arbitrate are unfounded.

At oral argument, both counsel argued that our tentative decision could be read to constrain the trial court's discretion. We now make clear that the court's earlier declaration of in forma pauperis is not dispositive, and Emergent may conduct the limited discovery into finances the trial court allows without fear of waiver of arbitration. Addressing Aronow's concern, we hold that the trial court has discretion to decide Aronow's ability to pay arbitration fees and can do so upon declarations with supporting exhibits or after conducting an evidentiary hearing.

First, the law effectively presumes that everyone who signs a contract has read it thoroughly, whether or not that is true. A basic rule of contract law is, “ ‘in the absence of fraud, overreaching or excusable neglect, that one who signs an instrument may not avoid the impact of its terms on the ground that he failed to read the instrument before signing it.’ ” (Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1588, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 901.) Moreover, courts must also presume parties understood the agreements they sign, and that the parties intended whatever the agreement objectively provides, whether or not they subjectively did: “ ‘Where the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, their mutual intention is to be determined, whenever possible, from the language of the writing alone.’ ... ‘[T]he parties' expressed objective intent, not their unexpressed subjective intent, governs.’ ” (In re Tobacco Cases I (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 42, 47, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 313.) And finally, in perhaps the biggest legal fiction of all, we are required to presume that parties to a contract both know

[219 Cal.App.4th 94]

and have in mind “ ‘all applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made ... necessarily enter into the contract and form a part of it, without any stipulation to that effect, as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated.’ ” (Swenson v. File (1970) 3 Cal.3d 389, 393, 90 Cal.Rptr. 580, 475 P.2d 852.)

Here, what these legal fictions mean is that while we certainly believe Callahan was fully aware of and intended to enter into the arbitration provisions included in its retainer agreements, we merely presume plaintiffs were and did. And while we also believe Callahan understood that because its arbitration provisions were silent as to cost,Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2 would form a part of the provision and require plaintiffs to “pay [a] pro rata share of the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator, together with other expenses of the arbitration incurred or approved by the neutral arbitrator,” we merely acknowledge that plaintiffs are presumed to have understood that too.

But presuming plaintiffs understood they would have to share in the cost of arbitration is as far as these legal fictions take us. Plaintiffs' presumed knowledge of the law does not afford us any basis to conclude they would have had any idea of just how much a pro rata share of those expenses and fees might be. Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2 does not specify amounts, and there is no evidence Callahan ever disclosed that information to plaintiffs—or even hinted to them that the out-of-pocket cost of an arbitration forum would be significantly higher than the cost of paying filing fees in court.

Moreover, as long as we are presuming parties' knowledge of the law, we will presume both plaintiffs and Callahan were aware of California's long standing public policy of ensuring that all litigants have access to the justice system for resolution of their grievances, without regard to their financial means. (Martin v. Superior Court (1917) 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135.) As our Legislature has declared, “our legal system cannot provide ‘equal justice under law’ unless all persons have access to the courts without regard to their economic means.” (Gov. Code, § 68630, subd. (a).)

However, we need not go as far as either Gutierrez or Parada did in resolving this appeal. We need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether the arbitration agreements are actually unenforceable for any of the reasons set forth in plaintiffs' oppositions to Callahan's petitions to compel arbitration. Instead, we assume for purposes of this appeal that the courts' earlier orders compelling arbitration were correct. The only issue before us is whether plaintiffs, each of whom were subsequently granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis in the trial court, could likewise be excused from the obligation to pay fees associated with arbitration. We conclude they could.

[219 Cal.App.4th 96]

If, as plaintiffs contend, they lack the means to share the cost of the arbitration, to rule otherwise might effectively deprive them of access to any forum for resolution of their claims against Callahan. We will not do that. Of course, as the trial court recognized, we cannot order the arbitration forum to waive its fees, as a court would do in the case of an indigent litigant. Nor do we have authority to order Callahan to pay plaintiffs' share of those fees. What we can do, however, is give Callahan a choice: if the trial court determines that any of these plaintiffs is unable to share in the cost of the arbitration, Callahan can elect to either pay that plaintiff's share of the arbitration cost and remain in arbitration, or waive its right to arbitrate that plaintiff's claim.

Admittedly, this resolution may result in Callahan paying a greater share of the arbitration cost than its retainer agreements otherwise required. But given the financial condition of these clients at the time they signed those retainer agreements, Callahan could not have been confident they would ever be able to pay a great deal toward the cost of arbitration in the event of a dispute. In fact, it might be fair to say Callahan had more of a hope than an expectation that arbitration costs would ever actually be shared with these plaintiffs. And when we balance that mere hope against the very real possibility these plaintiffs might be deprived of a forum if they are accorded no relief from these costs, it is clear which consideration must prevail.

Consequently, we reverse the trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion. And because the trial court made no express findings concerning plaintiffs' claimed inability to share the cost of arbitration in connection with its prior order, we remand the case to the trial court with directions to do so. Specifically, the trial court must estimate the anticipated cost of the arbitration proceeding previously ordered, and then determine whether any of these plaintiffs are financially able to pay their pro rata share of that cost. If the court determines that any plaintiff is unable to do so, it must issue an order specifying that Callahan has the option of either paying that plaintiff's share of the arbitration cost or waiving its right to arbitrate that that [sic.] plaintiff's case and allowing the case to proceed in court.

Following the general principles set forth in Martin , this court and the Courts of Appeal have afforded indigent civil litigants the ability to obtain meaningful access to the judicial process in a great variety of contexts. (See, e.g., Majors v. Superior Court (1919) 181 Cal. 270, 184 P. 18 [right of civil indigent litigant to obtain jury on retrial without prepayment of jury fees]; Isrin v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 153, 45 Cal.Rptr. 320, 403 P.2d 728 (Isrin) [indigent civil plaintiff could not be denied in forma pauperis status because represented by counsel on contingent fee basis];

[234 Cal.Rptr.3d 839]

Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649, 94 Cal.Rptr. 398, 484 P.2d 70 (Ferguson) [right of indigent civil litigant to file appeal without payment of appeal fees]; Earls v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 109, 98 Cal.Rptr. 302, 490 P.2d 814 (Earls) [indigent civil litigant may not be denied in forma pauperis status on the ground that litigant may be able to afford fees through

[5 Cal.5th 605]

savings over several months]; Conover v. Hall (1974) 11 Cal.3d 842, 114 Cal.Rptr. 642, 523 P.2d 682 (Conover) [right of indigent civil litigant to obtain injunction without providing an injunction bond]; Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565 (Payne) [right of indigent prisoner who is a defendant in a civil case to be provided meaningful access to judicial process, including representation by counsel if necessary]; Yarbrough v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 197, 216 Cal.Rptr. 425, 702 P.2d 583 [explaining trial court's responsibilities under Payne]; County of Sutter v. Superior Court (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 770, 53 Cal.Rptr. 424 (County of Sutter) [right of indigent civil litigant to obtain waiver of bond requirement imposed by Gov. Code, § 947]; Bank of America v. Superior Court (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 575, 63 Cal.Rptr. 366 (Bank of America) [right of indigent out-of-state civil litigant to obtain waiver of security for costs required by Code Civ. Proc., § 1030]; Roberts v. Superior Court (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 235, 70 Cal.Rptr. 226 (Roberts) [right

[420 P.3d 753]

of indigent civil litigant to obtain waiver of appeal bond required by Code Civ. Proc., § 985.5]; Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 236, 97 Cal.Rptr. 550 (Cohen) [right of indigent civil plaintiff who could not afford service by statutorily prescribed publication to utilize alternative reasonable method of service]; Solorzano v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 603, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 (Solorzano) [trial court abused its discretion in appointing a privately compensated discovery referee that indigent plaintiffs could not afford]; Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1436–1443, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 (conc. opn. of Johnson, J.) (Baltayan) [right of indigent out-of-state civil plaintiff to exemption from security undertaking required by Code Civ. Proc. § 1030]; Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 493 (Roldan) [trial court may not consign indigent plaintiffs to an arbitration process they cannot afford to pursue].)

The general teaching of this long line of decisions is that California courts, pursuant to the principles of the in forma pauperis doctrine, have the inherent discretion to facilitate an indigent civil litigant's equal access to the judicial process even when the relevant statutory provisions that impose fees or other expenses do not themselves contain an exception for needy litigants.

Moreover, this line of cases also demonstrates that the exercise of judicial discretion in furtherance of facilitating equal access to justice is not limited to excusing the payment of fees that the government charges for government-provided services. Judicial authority to facilitate meaningful access to indigent litigants extends as well to excusing statutorily imposed expenses that are intended to protect third parties (e.g., injunction or damage bonds) and to devising alternative procedures (e.g., additional methods of service or meaningful access) so that indigent litigants are not, as a practical matter, denied their day in court. (See Conover, supra, 11 Cal.3d 842, 114 Cal.Rptr. 642, 523 P.2d 682; County of Sutter, supra, 244 Cal.App.2d 770, 53 Cal.Rptr. 424; Bank of America, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d 575, 63 Cal.Rptr. 366;

[5 Cal.5th 606]

Roberts, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d 235, 70 Cal.Rptr. 226; Cohen, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d 236, 97 Cal.Rptr. 550; Baltayan, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 1427, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 72;

[234 Cal.Rptr.3d 840]

Payne, supra, 17 Cal.3d 908, 132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565.)

Finally, these cases demonstrate that the policy of affording indigent litigants meaningful access to the judicial process establishes restrictions not only upon potential barriers created by legislatively imposed fees or procedures, but also upon court-devised policies or practices that have the effect of denying to qualified indigent litigants the equal access to justice that the in forma pauperis doctrine was designed to provide. (See, e.g., Isrin, supra, 63 Cal.2d 153, 45 Cal.Rptr. 320, 403 P.2d 728; Earls, supra, 6 Cal.3d 109, 98 Cal.Rptr. 302, 490 P.2d 814; Solorzano, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 603, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 401; Roldan, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 493.)

The decisions in Solorzano and Roldan reveal a fundamental aspect of the California in forma pauperis doctrine that is directly relevant to the issue presented here. As these decisions demonstrate, under California law when a litigant in a judicial proceeding has qualified for in forma pauperis status, a court may not consign the indigent litigant to a costly private alternative procedure that the litigant cannot afford and that effectively negates the purpose and benefit of in forma pauperis status. In other words, whatever a court's authority may be in general to outsource to privately compensated individuals or entities part or all of the court's judicial duties with respect to litigants who can pay for such private services, a court may not engage in such outsourcing in the case of in forma pauperis litigants when the practical effect is to deprive such litigants of the equal access to justice that in forma pauperis status was intended to afford.

The facts in this case are not materially different from Roldan. Plaintiff was ordered to arbitrate her claims and she proceeded to do so. But after nearly three years of arbitration, during which defendants supposedly "engaged in a scorched earth policy and ... ‘piled on’ the onerous costs of arbitration[,]" she claims to be unable to continue to afford to arbitrate. Though there are factual disputes about her current financial situation, if her claimed inability to pay is true, forcing her to remain in the arbitral forum with an

[232 Cal.Rptr.3d 162]

obligation to pay half the fees will lead to "the very real possibility [that she] might be deprived of a forum" to resolve her grievances against defendants. (Roldan, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 96, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 493.) As in Roldan, such an outcome is intolerable.

The very reason plaintiff filed the underlying court action against defendants is because their alleged wrongful acts led her and her husband to lose a significant amount of money. And, in the many years of pursuing her case in arbitration, it appears defendants' tactical decisions have further contributed to plaintiff's ostensible financial ruin. In other words, defendants appear to have effectively hindered plaintiff's continued performance under the arbitration provisions. Basic contract law dictates that "hindrance of the other party's performance operates to excuse that party's nonperformance." (Erich v. Granoff (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 920, 930, 167 Cal.Rptr. 538.)

Further, from a public policy standpoint, a defendant accused of wrongdoing should not be permitted to avoid potential liability by forcing the

[22 Cal.App.5th 979]

matter to arbitration and subsequently making it so expensive that the plaintiff eventually has no choice but to give up. To hold otherwise would be to turn " ‘ "and justice for all" ’ " into " ‘ "and justice for those who can afford it" ’ " and " ‘threaten the very underpinnings of our social contract.’ " (Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 263, fn. 25, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 241.) The interest in avoiding such an outcome far outweighs the interest, however strong, in respecting parties' agreements to arbitrate. (Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 77, 90, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 267 [preference for arbitration not served by "agreement that effectively blocks every forum for the redress of disputes, including arbitration itself"].)

Here, plaintiff did not argue unconscionability or otherwise challenge the enforceability

[232 Cal.Rptr.3d 164]

of the arbitration provisions. She acknowledged the court properly granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration and had issued a corresponding nonappealable order. And, her summary judgment opposition papers clearly stated: "[Plaintiff] is not trying to claim that the arbitration clause was unconscionable when signed nor is she seeking to deprive [defendants] of their right to arbitration. Plaintiff is fine with either forum so long as she can proceed in one of them." The court, therefore, erred in focusing on unconscionability as the primary issue to be decided.

In sum, we hold, as we did in Roldan , when a party who has engaged in arbitration in good faith is unable to afford to continue in such a forum, that party may seek relief from the superior court. If sufficient evidence is presented on these issues, and the court concludes the party's financial status is not a result of the party's intentional attempt to avoid arbitration, the court may issue an order specifying: (1) the arbitration shall continue so long as the other party to the arbitration agrees to pay, or the arbitrator orders it to pay, all fees and costs of the arbitration; and (2) if neither of those occur, the arbitration shall be deemed "had" and the case may proceed in the superior court.³

As our Supreme Court has explained, "[b]oth California and federal law treat the substitution of arbitration for litigation as the mere replacement of one dispute resolution forum for another, resulting in no inherent disadvantage." (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1152, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 311 P.3d 184.) With the rising costs of arbitration (see Toyo Tire Holdings Of Americas Inc. v. Continental Tire North America, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 609 F.3d 975, 980-981 ), our decision today ensures those compelled to arbitrate will not, as a result, be inherently disadvantaged.

Liu also contests the denial of her motion seeking an order compelling PFA to advance the costs of arbitration. She argues the trial court did not properly assess her ability to pay arbitration costs. We conclude the court did not err in denying the motion.

When an arbitration agreement requires the parties to share the costs of arbitration, and a party moves to compel the other side to advance arbitration costs, the trial court must determine the costs of arbitration and the moving party's ability to pay. (Roldan v. Callahan Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 94-96 (Roldan).) If the court finds the moving party "lack[s] the means to share the cost of the arbitration" such that to require them to share the arbitration costs "might effectively deprive them of access to any forum for resolution of their claims," the court must order the financially solvent party to either pay the moving party's share of the arbitration costs or waive its right to arbitrate that party's claim. (Id. at p. 96.)

We are not aware of any authority discussing the standard of review applicable to a trial court's decision whether to grant a motion to advance the costs of arbitration. We believe the court's decision was in its discretion, and therefore, apply the abuse of discretion standard.

Here, the parties' arbitration provision was silent as to allocation of arbitration expenses. Therefore, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2, each party was required to "pay his pro rata share of the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator together with other expenses incurred or approved by the neutral arbitrator . . . ." Liu argued that the arbitration costs would be $12,000, and cited to a page of the American Arbitration

Page 6

Association's "fee schedule" for arbitration which does not, in fact, state that costs would be $12,000. She also submitted a declaration stating that her expenses exceeded her income over the preceding four months: for example, that she earned $27,250 in rental property income and paid car loans of $5,700. Based on this evidence, she argued that she was "unable to pay" for a pro rata share of the costs of arbitration.

Liu failed to meet her burden as the moving party of showing that she was unable to pay her share of the arbitration costs. First, her claim that arbitration costs would be $12,000 was not supported by the evidence she cited. Second, the limited snapshot of her income and expense (which did not include evidence of her assets, such as her real estate holdings) did not demonstrate that she was unable to pay any arbitration costs. By contrast, in Roldan, where the court found a "very real possibility these plaintiffs might be deprived of a forum if they are accorded no relief from these costs," there was evidence the moving parties "relied on section 8 housing subsidies to pay for their apartments." (Roldan, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90, 96.)