How do the courts determine what an equitable distribution of property between divorcing spouses is?

(a)

(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, after the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of the marital property, the court may transfer ownership of an interest in property described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, grant a monetary award, or both, as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded.

(2) The court may transfer ownership of an interest in:

(i) a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, from one party to either or both parties;

(ii) subject to the consent of any lienholders, family use personal property, from one or both parties to either or both parties; and

(iii) subject to the terms of any lien, real property jointly owned by the parties and used as the principal residence of the parties when they lived together, by:

1. ordering the transfer of ownership of the real property or any interest of one of the parties in the real property to the other party if the party to whom the real property is transferred obtains the release of the other party from any lien against the real property;

2. authorizing one party to purchase the interest of the other party in the real property, in accordance with the terms and conditions ordered by the court; or

3. both.

[...]

(b) The court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award, or the terms of the transfer of the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both, after considering each of the following factors:

(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;

(2) the value of all property interests of each party;

(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;

(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;

(5) the duration of the marriage;

(6) the age of each party;

(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;

(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;

(9) the contribution by either party of property described in §8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety;

(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and

(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.

(c) The court may reduce to a judgment any monetary award made under this section, to the extent that any part of the award is due and owing.

When a marriage is dissolved, "the property interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably, with careful consideration given to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by the respective spouses[.]" Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626, 629 (1984). If a party to a divorce seeks a marital property award, the circuit court must undertake a three-step process to determine how the marital property should be distributed between the parties and whether a monetary award would be appropriate to balance the equities after distribution:

First, for each disputed item of property, the court must determine whether it is marital or nonmarital. Second, the court must determine the value of all marital property. Third, the court must decide if the division of marital property according to title would be unfair. If so, the [circuit court] may make a monetary award to rectify any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be titled.

Brown v. Brown, 195 Md. App. 72, 109-10 (2010) (internal citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted); see also FL §§ 8-203 to 8-205.

If a party petitions for a monetary award, the trial court must undertake "a three-step process which may culminate in a monetary award." Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 499, 629 A.2d 70 (1993); see F.L. §§ 8-203 to 8-205; see also Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md.App. 583, 623-24, 923 A.2d 149 (2007); Ware v. Ware, 131 Md.App. 207, 213, 748 A.2d 1031 (2000). First, for each disputed item of property, the court must determine whether it is marital or nonmarital. F.L. § § 8-201(e)(1), 8-203, 8-205(a)(1); Flanagan, 181 Md.App. at 519, 956 A.2d 829. Second, the court must determine the value of all marital property. F.L. §§ 8-204, 8-205(a)(1); Flanagan, 181 Md.App. at 519, 956 A.2d 829. Third, the court must decide if the division of marital property according to title would be unfair. If so, the chancellor may make a monetary award to rectify any inequity " 'created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be

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titled.' " Id. at 520, 956 A.2d 829 (quoting Doser v. Doser, 106 Md.App. 329, 349, 664 A.2d 453 (1995)); see F.L. § 8-205(a); Long, 129 Md.App. at 578-79, 743 A.2d 281.19

One of the functions of the circuit court in a divorce action is to equitably distribute the parties'"marital property." "`Marital property' means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage." FL § 8-201(e)(1). The marital or non-marital characteristic of property is for the most part not a function of ownership or title. Except for real property covered by FL § 8-201 (e)(2), "marital property" does not include property acquired before the marriage, acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party, excluded by valid agreement, or directly traceable to any of those sources. FL § 8-201(e)(3).

When spouses in a divorce action are disputing whether certain property is marital, the court "shall determine which property is marital." FL § 8-203(a). Once the court has determined which of the property, regardless of ownership, is marital, it must value the marital property. FL § 8-204(a). Then, after considering the applicable factors under FL § 8-205(b), it must decide whether to grant a monetary award to adjust the equities of the parties. One of those factors is the value of all property interests of the parties, i.e., their marital and non-marital property. FL § 8-205(b)(2).

When a party requests a monetary award, a trial court must complete a three-step process before determining whether to grant such an award. First, the court must categorize each disputed item of property as marital or non-marital. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405, 211 A.3d 510 (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519, 956 A.2d 829 ). "Second, the court must determine the value of all marital property." Id. (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519, 956 A.2d 829). Finally, the court " ‘must decide if the division of marital property according to title would be unfair,’ and if so, it ‘may make a monetary award to rectify any inequality created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be titled.’ " Id. at 405–06, 211 A.3d 510 (quoting Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519–20, 956 A.2d 829). As part of this final step, the court must consider the eleven factors enumerated in FL § 8-205(b) :

(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;

(2) the value of all property interests of each party;

(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;

(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;

(5) the duration of the marriage;

(6) the age of each party;

(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;

(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;

(9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety;

(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and

(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.

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Mr. Wasyluszko does not argue that the trial court failed to consider these factors. Indeed, we commend the court for its extensive review of the statutory factors. Cf. Imagnu v. Wodajo, 85 Md. App. 208, 221, 582 A.2d 590 (1990) ("[I]n making a monetary award, the chancellor need not enunciate every factor he considered on the record, but must at least state on the record that he considered the required factors in making his decision." (citing Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. App. 577, 585, 508 A.2d 996 (1986) )).

Instead, Mr. Wasyluszko argues that the court abused its discretion by "fail[ing] to provide an explanation as to how [its] consideration of the enumerated factors resulted in an award amount of $840,000." He further argues that the court "abused its discretion by awarding a monetary award amount without explaining how the amount was calculated and how that calculation relates to the enumerated factors."

Mr. Wasyluszko cites no legal authority to support his contention that a court must explain how it calculated the monetary award. Ms. Wasyluszko, however, has directed us to two instructive cases: Long v. Long, 129 Md. App. 554, 743 A.2d 281 (2000), and Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 956 A.2d 829 (2008), both of which involved large disparities in the distribution of marital property between the parties.

In Long, this Court did not find any error in the chancellor's factual findings, but we did find "the bottom line award ... to be in error." 129 Md. App. at 575, 743 A.2d 281. The chancellor expressly considered each of the FL § 8-205(b) factors, and, "[w]here the facts were controverted, the chancellor generally found Wife's evidence more credible than that of Husband[.]" Id. at 577, 743 A.2d 281. However, despite the "vast chasm between Husband's and Wife's titled assets and the significant accrual of marital assets over the ten-year period of marriage, ... the chancellor nonetheless awarded only $225,000 to Wife, or 19.8 percent of the marital assets." Id. at 575, 743 A.2d 281. We noted that "the monetary award tilt[ed] lopsidedly in favor of Husband" and remanded the award due to the chancellor's failure "to give adequate force to his own findings." Id. at 575, 578, 743 A.2d 281.

In Flanagan, we vacated the monetary award "[b]ecause the circuit court did not adequately explain the basis for its monetary award, and because the award resulted in appellee's entitlement to almost 90% of the value of the marital property[.]" 181 Md. App. at 522, 956 A.2d 829. We noted that the monetary award would have effectively granted the appellee the entire value of the marital home, and overall, the award was "startlingly large in light of the total value of the marital property." Id. at 525, 956 A.2d 829. We calculated that the appellee would retain 86.7% of the marital property, and "the court did not explain the enormous percentage on the basis of appellant's conduct leading to the parties’ estrangement, or indeed on any particular basis." Id. at 526–27, 956 A.2d 829. We concluded that "the sizeable, unexplained disparity resulting from the monetary award compel[led] us to vacate the award." Id.

Our research has uncovered no other cases discussing the calculation of the monetary award itself. In both Long and Flanagan , the court erred because it failed to explain or justify a monetary award that resulted in a substantial disparity in the distribution of marital property.

Here, based on the court's findings concerning marital and non-marital property, the $840,000 monetary award resulted in Mr. Wasyluszko retaining 54% of the marital property and Ms. Wasyluszko retaining

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46%.12 Not only is this not a sizeable disparity, but the disparity actually favors Mr. Wasyluszko. The award here does not create such a lopsided result that a specific explanation of the court's calculation is needed beyond consideration of the FL § 8-205(b) factors. "A chancellor is not required to articulate every step in his thought processes. A judge is presumed to know the law and to properly apply it. That presumption is not rebutted by mere silence." Imagnu, 85 Md. App. at 221, 582 A.2d 590 (quoting Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350, 370, 475 A.2d 1214 (1984) ). Though we vacate the monetary award due to errors in determining Mr. Wasyluszko's non-marital funds in three accounts as discussed above, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court's failure to fully enunciate how its consideration of the statutory factors resulted in the particular monetary award in favor of Ms. Wasyluszko.