When will the court sustain a motion to suppress evidence of child pornography found by a police search warrant?

Even though the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress, we will sustain the denial if the error was harmless. See United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that admission of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is subject to a harmless error analysis). Although Brobst's statement made at his residence should have been suppressed, the child pornographic materials produced as a result of the

[558 F.3d 997]

search and Brobst's separate post-Miranda statements admitting to possession of the materials were not "tainted" and were properly admitted by the district court. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Because Brobst's convictions were based upon more than his "in custody" statement, we hold that it was harmless error for the district court to admit Brobst's statement made in violation of his Miranda rights.

Brobst argues that the warrantless arrest was illegal on two theories: (1) the search warrant did not cure the need for an arrest warrant and (2) there was no probable cause and exigent circumstances to arrest based upon Montana law. We review whether officers had probable cause for a warrantless arrest de novo. United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A), 229 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.2000).

In general, police officers may not enter a person's home to arrest him without obtaining an arrest warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The Fourth Amendment provides: