The following excerpt is from U.S. v. Thorpe, 191 F.3d 339 (2nd Cir. 1998):
Not infrequently, such remands occur when the district court's sentencing remarks indicate a mistaken belief that it lacked the power to make a downward departure. See, e.g., United States v. Ekhator, 17 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1994) ("If in
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declining to depart the district court stated a belief that it had no power to depart, and if that belief was erroneous, we vacate the sentence and remand for further proceedings within the proper legal framework. Further, if we are unable to discern whether the district court's refusal to depart resulted from the exercise of its discretion or instead from a perceived, but mistaken, lack of authority, we remand to the district court for resentencing.") (citations omitted); United States v. Ogbondah, 16 F.3d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) ("We next consider whether the district court understood its authority to depart downward on this ground. If the record is ambiguous, as it is here, we must remand to the district court to determine whether it understood the full scope of its authority.") (citation omitted).
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