When will a federal judge review a federal prosecutor's decision not to charge a sex offender?

We repeatedly have echoed that theme. See United States v. Duran, 41 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1994) ("If the prosecutor has probable cause to believe a defendant committed a crime, the decision of whether to prosecute and the charges to be filed rests with the prosecutor."); United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have no jurisdiction to review prosecutors' charging decisions, absent proof of discrimination based on suspect characteristics such as race, religion, gender or personal beliefs. This is true, even where the prosecutor's decision . . . was motivated primarily by a desire to impose a harsher sentence, and was inconsistent with the treatment given other defendants . . . . [A]`wide disparity' between sentencing schemes of different jurisdictions does not violate equal protection, even where two persons who commit the same crime are subject to different sentences.") (citations omitted); United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[S]eparation of powers concerns prohibit us from reviewing a prosecutor's charging decisions absent a prima facie showing that it rested on an impermissible basis, such as gender, race or denial of a constitutional right.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Redondo-Lemos , 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions are particularly ill-suited for broad judicial oversight . . . . Such decisions are normally made as a result of careful professional judgment as to the strength of the evidence, the availability of resources, the visibility of the crime and the likely deterrent effect on the particular defendant and others similarly situated.") (citation and footnote omitted).