When will a court reverse a finding that the exclusion of testimony by two police officers from the prosecution's case in the case in which they witnessed appellant committing a vehicle code violation?

The trial court also has broad discretion to limit the introduction of evidence that, while it may be relevant, is of limited probative value. (Evid. Code, 352.) A trial court's determination whether evidence is relevant or has sufficient probative value to be admitted is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 554-555; People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314.) We reverse only if

Page 13

the trial court's ruling was "'arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious as a matter of law. [Citation.]'" (People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282.)

We conclude first that the exclusion of the officers' testimony did not violate appellant's constitutional right to present a defense. As we have noted above, the application of ordinary rules of evidence does not impermissibly infringe a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 90.) Appellant was not denied the opportunity to present his defense. Officers Banta and Moran both testified in the prosecution's case-in-chief that they observed appellant commit numerous Vehicle Code violations during the course of the pursuit. But while defense counsel cross-examined Banta, he chose not to cross-examine Moran. In addition, appellant testified in his own defense.

If the trial court was correct in ruling the proffered additional testimony irrelevant, then obviously no constitutional error occurred. If, instead, the trial court erred in that conclusion, it is nonetheless true that appellant was allowed to present his defense. That he was not allowed to support that defense with the additional testimony of the officers simply did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. (Cf. People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 [excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused's due process right to present a defense].)