When will a court grant a continuance to a defendant's attorney at his sentencing hearing?

In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 (Maddox), where the court stated that "a counsel who has been denied the opportunity to prepare is the equivalent of no counsel at all." (Id. at p. 652.) However, Maddox involved a very different situation. There, the defendant made timely pretrial requests to represent himself, and his appointed counsel made a timely motion to be relieved so that the defendant could proceed in pro per. The trial court denied each of those requests, but then did a "sudden about-face" on the day of trial, allowing him to proceed in pro per but refusing to grant him a continuance so that he could prepare. (Id. at p. 651.) The Maddox court held that the trial court erred. It rejected the People's claim that defendant's lack of preparation stemmed from his refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel, noting that "to do so would be inconsistent with our determination that he was entitled to assert his right to represent himself." (Id. at p. 654.) Further, there was no showing that the defendant sought a continuance for "the purpose merely of delaying the trial." (Id. at p. 655.)

In this case, defendant's request to relieve his retained counsel was not timely - it was not made until eight months after trial. Although defendant claimed to have fired the Geragos firm a month before the October 28, 2011 sentencing hearing, this was not reflected in the minutes of October 14, 2011, when the trial court granted a two-week continuance. Further, defendant himself was responsible for his attorney's unpreparedness at the sentencing hearing: the Geragos firm had prepared post-trial motions, but defendant had instructed her firm "not to file these documents." Defendant's refusal to cooperate with his attorneys cannot be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Cf. People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 682 ["a criminal defendant cannot willfully refuse to cooperate with his appointed attorney, thereby possibly hampering his own defense, and then claim he is entitled to a new attorney because counsel has not been effective"], overruled on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421; see also People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 116,

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