When will a court grant a continuance of a defendant's trial over the objection of his counsel?

Here, at the time defendant requested to represent himself, his court-appointed attorney's engagement in another trial, as well as his need to interview an in-custody witness in defendant's case and perhaps prepare a Pitchess motion, constituted good cause in the trial court's discretion to grant a brief continuance of the defendant's trial, despite defendant's refusal to waive time. (See People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 555 [unavailability of court-appointed counsel because of engagement in another trial may constitute good cause under 1382 to continue trial over defendant's objection, even in the absence of other exceptional circumstances].) However, rather than face the prospect of a continuance, and dissatisfied by the prosecution's offers, defendant chose to represent himself. The next day, just before jury selection was to begin, with jurors about to enter the courtroom, he sought to relinquish his pro. per. status and have his stand-by counsel appointed to represent him (either solely or as co-counsel). Because stand-by counsel had been appointed for the purpose of taking over only in the event defendant engaged in disruptive behavior, defendant's change of heart as to whether he was ready for trial did not entitle him to have stand-by counsel appointed for trial. Further, the record is clear that defendant was not asking for, and did not want, the reappointment of the attorney he had relieved, which would necessitate a continuance. He wanted stand-by counsel, and only stand-by counsel, appointed to represent him, and wanted the trial to proceed immediately. Of course, having been appointed that day, and having no familiarity with the case, stand-by counsel could not reasonably have been prepared for trial, and the court could not have compelled him to proceed without a continuance. Under these circumstances, defendant's request to relinquish his pro. per. status was not unequivocal, because it was necessarily conditioned on the appointment of stand-by counsel as trial counsel, and on the trial proceeding that day without delay. On

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this basis alone, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to relinquish self-representation.