When will a court award attorney fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute?

analogous cases involving the award of attorney fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16. The anti-SLAPP statute requires courts to "award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to [s]ection 128.5." ( 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Courts have concluded that "[t]he reference to section 128.5 in section 425.16, subdivision (c) means a court must use the procedures and apply the substantive standards of section 128.5 in deciding whether to award attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. " ( Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 199, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 154.)

Additional case law supports our conclusion that the requirements of section 128.7 apply to sanctions under section 1008, subdivision (d). Although we are not aware of any other case that has considered the procedural rules a court must apply in imposing sanctions under section 1008, subdivision (d), several cases have addressed the substantive standard of conduct for which sanctions may apply. In every case that we are aware of, the court has upheld sanctions under section 1008, subdivision (d) only for conduct that violates the standards of section 128.7. (See, e.g., Young v. Rosenthal (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 123, 260 Cal.Rptr. 369 [sanctions appropriate because motion for reconsideration was "clearly frivolous and

[234 Cal.Rptr.3d 772]

... brought in bad faith"]; In re Marriage of Green (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 14, 26, 261 Cal.Rptr. 294 [motion for reconsideration was "totally and completely without merit, and was frivolous"]; Lucas v. Santa Maria Public Airport Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1028, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 [sanctions overturned because the trial court made no finding that the sanctioned party "engaged in bad faith or that the reconsideration motion was frivolous"]; Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 736, 745, 285 Cal.Rptr. 1 [sanctions overturned because trial "court's conclusion that the motion was frivolous and brought solely for the purpose of delay was clearly an abuse of discretion"].)