When a defendant is charged with murder, does the trial court have a sua sponte duty to instruct on imperfect self defense?

When a defendant is charged with murder, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on imperfect self-defense if the evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 159.) The need to instruct "arises only when there is substantial evidence that the defendant killed in unreasonable self-defense, not when the evidence is 'minimal and insubstantial.' " (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.) "Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to 'deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive." (Id. at fn. 8, quoting People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684.)

"Self-defense requires an actual and reasonable belief in the need to defend against an imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. [Citation.] If, however, the killer actually, but unreasonably, believed in the need to defend himself or herself from imminent death or great bodily injury, the theory of 'imperfect self defense' applies to negate malice." (People v. Viramontes (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1261). Under both theories of perfect and imperfect self-defense, the defendant must have believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent danger to himself. (People v. Por Ye Her (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 349, 353.)

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