What is the test for sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute?

In reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Nevils , 598 F.3d 1158, 116364 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). Under this two-step inquiry, we therefore first consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and second, determine whether the evidence so viewed is adequate to allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id . at 1164.

Lemus was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), which prohibits, inter alia , possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The jury found that he possessed at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, subjecting him to the penalty specified in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). To violate this statute, actual possession is not required: constructive possession also suffices. "The term constructive possession does not connote a legal fiction. Rather, the term simply reflects the common sense notion that an individual may possess a controlled substance even though the substance is not on his person at the time of arrest." United States v. Disla , 805 F.2d 1340, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986).