California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Castillo, F069262 (Cal. App. 2016):
" ' "Deliberation" refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; "premeditation" means thought over in advance. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 824.) " 'Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly, but the express requirement for a concurrence of deliberation and premeditation excludes from murder of the first degree those homicides ... which are the result of mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed.' " [Citation.]" (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 593.)
"[D]eliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.]" (People v. Casares, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 824.) "[T]he legislative classification of murder into two degrees would be meaningless if "deliberation" and "premeditation" were construed as requiring no more reflection than
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may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill ...." (People v. Lunafelix (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 97, 100.) "Premeditation and deliberation require 'substantially more reflection ... than the mere amount of thought necessary to form the intention to kill.' [Citation.]" (People v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 822-823.) Consequently, a "finding of ... premeditation and deliberation is proper only when the slayer killed as the result of careful thought and weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or plan, carried on coolly and steadily, especially according to a preconceived design. [Citation.]" (People v. Rowland (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1, 7.)
" 'Given the presumption that an unjustified killing of a human being constitutes murder of the second, rather than of the first, degree, and the clear legislative intention to differentiate between first and second degree murder, [a reviewing court] must determine in any case of circumstantial evidence whether the proof is such as will furnish a reasonable foundation for an inference of premeditation and deliberation [citation] or whether it "leaves only to conjecture and surmise the conclusion that defendant either arrived at or carried out the intention to kill as the result of a concurrence of deliberation and premeditation." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1265, original italics.)
The Attorney General cites facts supporting an inference of intent to kill. We agree there was substantial evidence of intent to kill. However, the Attorney General fails to point to evidence showing "substantially more reflection" than a bare intent to kill.
People v. Anderson Factors
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