What is the test for limiting personal injury recovery to a person who is not related by blood or marriage?

Relying upon Ochoa v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.3d 159, 216 Cal.Rptr. 661, 703 P.2d 1 for guidance, the Thing court noted that greater certainty and a more reasonable limit on the exposure to liability is

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"Similar reasoning justifies limiting recovery to persons closely related by blood or marriage since, in common experience, it is more likely that they will suffer a greater degree of emotional distress than a disinterested witness to negligently caused pain and suffering or death. Such limitations are indisputably arbitrary since it is foreseeable that in some cases unrelated persons have a relationship to the victim or are so affected by the traumatic event that they suffer equivalent emotional distress. As we have observed, however, drawing arbitrary lines is unavoidable if we are to limit liability and establish meaningful rules for application by litigants and lower courts." (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 666, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814.)

As Thing and the cases cited therein make clear, policy considerations do not totally proscribe imposition of liability; limitation, rather than abrogation, is the goal. The key is the ability to fashion a balance of allowing recovery in certain circumstances without imposing unlimited liability out of proportion to negligent culpability. (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 664, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814.) Application of such a balance is not only permissible but mandated by the facts of this case.

If we were to deny the possibility of recovery to the parents, we would be ignoring the foreseeability of harm to them, the degree of certainty that injury was sustained, the closeness of the connection between defendant's conduct and any injuries sustained, the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct and the policy of preventing future harm; instead we would be giving undeserved weight to the burdens placed on the defendant and insurers. (Cf. Preston v. Goldman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 108, 118, 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d 476.)