What is the test for intentional racial discrimination in the jury selection process?

Appellants claim that these facts established a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination in the juror selection process, shifting the burden of proving non-discrimination to the defendants. Appellants' claim rests on two alternative theories. First, appellants contend that the jury selection process resulted in the "progressive decimation" of the number of Native Americans available for jury service: Despite a Native American population of 6.36 percent in the District, at most only 5.26 percent of the persons returning juror questionnaires were Native Americans, and only 2.5 percent of the persons remaining on the jury venire from which petit juries were chosen were Native Americans. We are told that this "progressive decimation" must be viewed in light of the fact that the race of each prospective juror was clearly displayed on the face of the returned questionnaires, affording those who granted exemptions a "clear opportunity to discriminate" against Native Americans. ¹¹ According to appellants, the "progressive decimation" of Native Americans available for jury service, coupled with the 'clear opportunity to discriminate' provided by the designation of race on the questionnaire, establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the juror selection process. Appellants cite Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972), in support of their position.