What is the test for error at the guilt phase of a murder trial?

Defendant makes three claims of error bearing on the guilt phase, but each is invalid under recent decisions of this court. He first contends that the exclusion for cause of one venireman who was unalterably opposed to the death penalty denied him a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The contention was rejected by a majority of this court in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 342-353 (plur. opn.), 374 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.), 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680.

Defendant next asserts that the exclusion for cause of the foregoing venireman also denied him a "neutral" jury on the issue of guilt. We held in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 68, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, that this question cannot be answered "until further research is done which makes it possible to draw reliable conclusions about the nonneutrality of 'California death-qualified' juries in California," i.e., juries from which veniremen who would always vote for the death penalty (the "automatic death penalty" group) are excluded. Defendant fails to provide us with any such studies.

[38 Cal.3d 61] Lastly defendant argues that the felony-murder rule, under which he was convicted in this case, denied him due process of law because it raised a conclusive presumption of malice. We rejected this contention in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472-476, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 ¹.