What is the test for contempt of court against a husband who marries a second wife while the first wife is still living?

because the divorced husband no longer had a wife living, it was held in People v. Hovey, 5 Barb. 117, that his after-marriage, although punishable as a contempt, did not constitute the crime of bigamy. We overruled that decision, but not at all upon the ground that the divorced wife remained the culprit's wife in any sense or respect, but for the reason that the statute, by its express words, disclosed an intention to make the crime of bigamy consist, not only in marrying a second time while the first wife was living, but in so marrying while under the prohibition of the law, and during the life of the woman who had been the wife before the decree of divorce. We construed these specific words as intended to force such a case into the meaning of the statute, which, without them, would not at all have embraced it, and without them would have led us to affirm People v. Hovey. Surely nothing was further from our thoughts, and from the careful reasoning of the opinion, than an idea that the divorced wife remained a wife as to the defendant,[103 N.Y. 292]and that he was a bigamist for that reason. We held him to be such because the statute put him in the situation of one having a wife living, for the purpose of enforcing the statutory provision.