What is the test for an equal protection claim under the Determinate Sentencing Act?

Defendant contends he was entitled to the "benefits" of the Determinate Sentencing Act (Pen.Code, 1170 et seq.)--specifically, discovery of statistics relating to sentences imposed in similar cases and disparate sentence review--under principles of equal protection. In People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115, however, the lead opinion rejected a claim that was substantially similar. We believe that its resolution of the point was correct: in our view, persons convicted under the death penalty law are manifestly not similarly situated to persons convicted under the Determinate Sentencing Act and accordingly cannot assert a meritorious claim to the "benefits" of the act under the equal protection clause (see, e.g., Tigner v. Texas (1940) 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549). Thus, we reject defendant's point.