What is the test for admitting or denying evidence of prior uncharged driving misconduct in a second degree vehicular murder case?

"A trial court should not exclude highly probative evidence unless the undue prejudice is unusually great. [Citation.] 'Undue prejudice' refers not to evidence that proves guilt, but to evidence that prompts an emotional reaction against the defendant and tends to cause the trier of fact to decide the case on an improper basis: 'The prejudice which exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence. "[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant's case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is 'prejudicial.' " ' " (People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 806.)

Appellant was charged with murder under an implied malice theory. To prove the murder charge, the prosecutor was required to show that, when appellant intentionally committed an act that was dangerous to human life, he "knew [his] . . . act . . . was dangerous to human life [] . . . [] [and he] deliberately . . . [acted] with conscious disregard for human . . . life." (CALCRIM No. 520.) Evidence of prior drunk driving arrests and convictions, earlier warnings appellant received, and information imparted to him through drunk driving offender programs, are probative of appellant's subjective knowledge of the risks associated with driving under the influence and his intent to act in conscious disregard of the danger to others. (See People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 112-116 [discussing appellate decisions affirming convictions for second degree vehicular murder in which evidence of prior uncharged driving misconduct had been admitted to prove the defendants' knowledge and intent].)

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