What is the test for admitting evidence of prior misconduct in a criminal case?

To establish intent, for example, the uncharged misconduct must merely be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant "`probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) A greater degree of similarity is required to establish that the defendant acted in accordance with a common design or plan and the greatest degree of similarity is required to prove identity. (Id. at pp. 402-403; see also People v. Nible (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 838, 848 [to be admissible to show identity, prior act must be sufficiently distinctive and similar to the charged crime that a proper inference may be drawn the same person committed both].)

Battles argues that the trial court erred in admitting the prosecution's rebuttal evidence regarding the 2002 residential burglary. Specifically he contends, as he did below, that the prior incident was so dissimilar from the current offense that the court should not have admitted evidence of it at trial. We review the trial court's rulings for an abuse of discretion (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637) and will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a showing of manifest abuse. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)