What is the test for a person to be found guilty of aiding and abetting a crime?

act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.' [Citation.] Furthermore, under the ' "natural and probable consequences" ' doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the offense he or she intended to facilitate or encourage, but also any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he or she aids and abets. [Citation.]" (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 295-296.)

" ' "A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]" [Citation.] Liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine "is measured by whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted." [Citation.]' [Citations.] A reasonably foreseeable consequence is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury who evaluates all the factual circumstances of the individual case." (People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 874.)

"Aider and abettor culpability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine for a nontarget, or unintended, offense committed in the course of committing a target offense has a different theoretical underpinning than aiding and abetting a target crime. Aider and abettor culpability for the target offense is based upon the intent of the aider and abettor to assist the direct perpetrator commit the target offense. By its very nature, aider and abettor culpability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is not premised upon the intention of the aider and abettor to commit the nontarget offense because the nontarget offense was not intended at all. It imposes vicarious liability for any offense committed by the direct perpetrator that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778 . . . [accomplice liability is vicarious].) Because the nontarget offense is unintended, the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to that offense is irrelevant and culpability

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