What is the test for a motion for a judgment of acquittal under the Hobbs Act?

Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the third count of his indictment, which involved appellant's participation in an incident where money was taken from a subcontractor. Although appellant argues that he was "assisting" the subcontractor by taking money out of the subcontractor's hand and handing it to the appellant's associate, who was brandishing a gun, we agree with the district court that a jury could reasonably infer that appellant's role in the incident established a violation of the Hobbs Act. The motion for a judgment of acquittal on the third count was properly denied because, viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to the government, crediting all inferences that could have been drawn in the government's favor .... [a] jury might fairly have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 548 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted).

Appellant also argues that the district erred in denying his new trial motion, which was based on "new evidence." We do not find error in the district court's memorandum and order denying a new trial. The "new evidence" relates to the discovery that a subcontractor who testified at appellant's trial committed a violation of a New York labor law in 1989 by failing to pay a laborer during a two week period. Appellant did not present evidence that his actions were taken in an attempt to recover wrongfully withheld wages as part of a legitimate labor dispute. His attempt to argue that the "new evidence" would bolster his claim that the disputes were within the scope of the "labor exception" to the Hobbs Act, see United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), is without merit. We affirm the denial of the new trial motion because the district court did not commit error in finding that the evidence would not be admissible and, even if admissible, the evidence was not "so material and non-cumulative that its admission would probably lead to an acquittal." United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotations omitted).

We reject appellant's challenges to his sentence. The district court's denial of a three-level reduction for having a role in the offense that is between "minor" and "minimal" under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 was not "clearly erroneous," United States v. Martin, 78 F.3d 808, 814 (2d Cir.1996), given the appellant's significant role in the acts for which he was convicted.