What is the test for a jury to determine whether a first degree murder can be found based upon the underlying felony of sodomy or attempted sodomy?

Defendant now contends that the jury instructions were impermissibly ambiguous and that the trial court failed to fulfill its sua sponte duty to offer clarifying instructions informing the jury that a first degree murder could not be based upon the underlying felony of sodomy or attempted sodomy, even though first degree murder committed in the commission of such crimes could support a special circumstance finding. Defendant's failure to request such a clarifying instruction at trial, however, waives his claim on appeal. (See People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627, ["A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language."]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285 [same].)

Moreover, the jury instructions were not ambiguous. The jurors were instructed that if they found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, then they were to determine whether either special circumstance was true. The jurors also were instructed to decide each special circumstance separately. These instructions correctly stated the law; if defendant wanted additional, clarifying instructions, he should have requested them. No ambiguity appearing, the trial court complied with its duty to "fully instruct the jury on the law applicable" (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, overruled on other grounds, People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531) and had no duty to further instruct the jury. ²⁴