California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Spann v. Ballesty, 276 Cal.App.2d 754, 81 Cal.Rptr. 229 (Cal. App. 1969):
The second part of this element is that defendant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that plaintiff was unable to escape from his position of danger. Here the requirement is less strict, and defendant may be charged with such knowledge if a reasonably prudent person would have realized plaintiff's inability to extricate himself. (Gillingham v. Greyhound Corp., 263 Cal.App.2d 564, 571, 69 Cal.Rptr. 728.) Everyone who testified, including defendant himself, agreed that plaintiff was inattentive, was not watching for oncoming vehicles, was looking straight ahead or to the left, away from the direction of defendant's car, and was moving into the path of the car. Since plaintiff was completely unaware of the approaching car, the jury could have concluded that defendant knew or should [276 Cal.App.2d 761] have known that plaintiff would be unable to escape from his position of danger.
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