What is the test for a declaration against penal interest under the hearsay rule?

Under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, a declarant's statement is admissible "if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made . . . so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true." (Evid. Code, 1230.) In addition to being against the declarant's penal interest, the statement must be "sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character." (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 611.)

To qualify as a statement against penal interest, the statement must be specifically disserving to the declarant; thus, any portions of the statement that are self-serving to the declarant must be excised from the statement. (People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 611-612.) To the extent the declarant attempts to " 'shift blame or curry favor,' " these aspects of the statement are not disserving. (Ibid.) Also, collateral statements that contain self-serving information cannot be deemed credible merely because they are

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incorporated in an admission of criminal culpability. (Ibid.) Thus, a statement " 'which is in part inculpatory and in part exculpatory (e.g., one which admits some complicity but places the major responsibility on others)' " is generally not trustworthy. (Id. at p. 612; see People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 883 [indicia of reliability lacking where declarant " 'blamed a coparticipant for the commission of the greater offense while admitting complicity to some lesser degree' "].)