What is the test for a claim that a jury was denied due process for awarding punitive damages?

We reject appellants' threshold claim that they were denied due process because the jury was given "virtually unlimited discretion" to award punitive damages. The jury's discretion was tempered by instructions to avoid passion or prejudice, and to consider the reprehensibility of the conduct and the amount which would have a deterrent effect in light of appellants' financial condition. The jury was also instructed that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to actual damages. We decline the invitation to be the first court in this state to rule that such instructions do not afford due process. (See Radell v. Comora (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1257-1260, 259 Cal.Rptr. 891 [rejecting due process argument].)

(2) Against Oosterbaan

Oosterbaan contends that the punitive damages assessed against him were not supported by the evidence, but we have already determined that there was substantial evidence of fraud, and fraud was a sufficient basis for the award. (Civ.Code, 3294, subds. (a) and (e); see Walker v. Signal Companies (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 982, 996, 149 Cal.Rptr. 119.) He also argues that the punitive damages awarded against him were excessive as a matter of law. We agree.