What is the state of the law on qualified immunity for police officers who did not have probable cause to arrest Mara?

Defendants do not here challenge the district courts determination that they lacked probable cause, or even arguable probable cause, to arrest Mara on January 2, 2013. Rather, they claim qualified immunity on the ground that they did not, in fact, arrest Mara on that date and, thus, did not require probable cause lawfully to engage him in a voluntary interview. See Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (holding that police do not violate Fourth Amendment by engaging person in voluntary conversation, and "[i]f there is no detentionno seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendmentthen no constitutional rights have been infringed"); Rivera v. Double A Transp., Inc. , 248 Conn. 21, 31, 727 A.2d 204, 209 (1999) (identifying unlawful

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restraint as element of false imprisonment). Moreover, they argue that, even when the facts are viewed most favorably to Mara, clearly established law would not have compelled "every reasonable officer" to have concluded that Mara was under arrest. Mullenix v. Luna , 136 S.Ct. at 308. We agree.