What is the prejudicial effect of evidence of physical abuse against a plaintiff in a sexual assault case?

In the face of the overwhelming weight of the proffered evidence, I regard its prejudicial effect to be slight; today, the same degree of opprobrium no longer attaches to prostitution as it did in more puritanical days, and the disapproval is tempered by pity. "[The] prejudice ... [was] only that [which is] inherent in [the] relevance [of the testimony]." (See Kessler v. Gray (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 284, 292, 143 Cal.Rptr. 496.)

People v. Rioz (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 905, 207 Cal.Rptr. 903 posits in a dictum that evidence of a woman having been beaten is the type of evidence which would justify exclusion of prostitution under section 352. I disagree. If prostitution is highly relevant, the effect of violence is for the jury. It is of course a factor which points towards defendant's guilt but it is not inconsistent with a woman having consented to sex but drawing the line at unexpected brutalization which, when it occurred, provided the motive for revenge and fabrication.